CPC 20th Anniversary – Opening Address

Delivered by Paul E. Kennedy, Chair of the CPC

Check against delivery

Good morning.

First, I would like to thank everyone for joining us today to mark 20 years of civilian oversight of the RCMP. I am very pleased to see individuals from such a variety of fields, including government, academia, NGOs and the media.

I would like to acknowledge the presence the Commissioner of the RCMP, distinguished members of the House of Commons Messers Norlock, Holland and Cullen as well as Senator Kenny. We are also joined here today by many of my provincial counterparts from the West to the East coast of Canada.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the presence of Mrs. Siddiqui, a member of the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security.

We are here today to talk about transparency and accountability. These are concepts that have been around in one form or another for quite some time. Transparency in the field of justice is manifested in our open court system and you see accountability expressed through freely held elections of your government representatives. These concepts are not static however. Rather, they are akin to the famous "memes" described by Richard Dawkins in his book "the Selfish Gene" and are self replicating and evolutionary. Most importantly they have found a home in the consciousness of western democracies.

In the public safety domain, the 1970's saw the emergence of the Ombudsman role as a response to the challenge of "who watches the watchers". In Canada, during that same period, concerns were expressed about an absence of oversight for policing. A number of provinces took legislative actions to address this through the establishment of civilian oversight bodies. At the federal level we saw the establishment of the Marin Commission in 1974 and of the MacDonald Commission in 1977 both of which examined the activities of the RCMP.

The MacDonald Commission, with its focus on the RCMP's national security activities, lead to the establishment of CSIS in 1984 and its civilian oversight body the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) with its suite of powers designed to discharge its mandate.

The Marin Commission, by contrast, dealt with discipline, grievances and complaints from the public. Marin envisioned the establishment of a "People's Watchman." A person who could focus the light of publicity on his concern as to injustices and needed change. A person who "can bring the lamp of scrutiny to otherwise dark places, even over the resistance of those who would draw the blinds."

Ten years after those fine words were spoken, the government in 1986 introduced legislation in response to Judge Marin's report. In October of 1988, some two years after its introduction, Parliament enacted Part VII of the RCMP Act and established the current Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP.

How does that legislation stack up against the recommendations of Judge Marin or other oversight models that Parliament had put in place leading up to 1988? The best way to answer this is to simply compare the powers of the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP with other similar bodies.

The Access to Information and Privacy Acts passed in 1982 and the CSIS Act (1984) with its establishment of the SIRC contain foundational powers that are not found in the CPC's legislative mandate. More specifically, they contain a right to access all information but for Cabinet confidences, a general power to summon witnesses and to subpoena evidence and the ability, where appropriate to hold hearings in private. The CPC has no such powers.

What went wrong? The gap between the vision found in Judge Marin's 1976 report and the 1988 legislation calls to mind the words of Abigail Adams, the wife of President John Adams who noted that "We have too many high sounding words and too few actions that correspond to them."

A principled approach to civilian oversight would, I believe, address the recommendation contained in the 2003 Report of the Auditor General wherein she observed that an oversight body should possess powers of review that are proportionate to the intrusiveness of the powers held by the body over which it exercises review. In Canada, the organization with the most intrusive powers is arguably the RCMP. But what does that mean for the CPC?

Are there consequences flowing from the inadequacies of the current civilian oversight model that governs the CPC? I believe that there are. And they are being manifested at two distinct levels.

The gradual erosion of public confidence in the police, in large part, due to a perceived lack of accountability. I have seen media reports wherein reference is made to public opinion polls which purport to say that the RCMP was still viewed favourably by 85 percent of the population. I for one don't put a lot of faith in such polls and I am not sure in a democracy whether any comfort can be taken from an arbitrary number whether it be 60 percent, 80 percent or 90 percent. The reality is that the police require the support and co-operation of all citizens to fulfill their functions effectively. This is what matters the most.

I prefer to rely upon my own experience during the past 35 years with public safety issues. I have observed a sea of change over that period that entails a general lack of respect and trust for public institutions including police institutions. One sees that general trend expressed daily in the media whether it be by a blogger, a letter written to the editor, an article by a journalist or an editorial. This cynicism is chronic as opposed to episodic. Police efforts to address these concerns have been perceived largely as self serving. Unsuccessful efforts to address public concerns have in a number of cases merely compounded public cynicism.

Independent civilian oversight I believe could play an effective role in addressing these challenges and help maintain and restore the public's confidence in the police. Effective civilian oversight would not only address the public's concerns but would also assist the police who are increasingly professionalizing their role and have become more remote from the concerns of citizens. An oversight body can bridge the police/public divide by asking questions that the police frequently don't ask themselves and by offering recommendations that would be more responsive to citizens concerns. Simply put, effective oversight brings the public perspective to the police.

Another, possibly more mundane, benefit in these times of financial constraint is simple cost effectiveness. An inadequate oversight model has recently forced the government in response to individual crises to establish a list of costly Commissions of Inquiry in the public safety area including those headed by Justices O'Connor, Major and Iaccobuci. My comments should not be taken as a criticism of the work performed by those eminent jurists, but merely to point out that such commissions are created to address gaps in existing oversight regimes. Unfortunately these inquiries are very costly.

When I consider the powers held by the Privacy Commissioner, the Auditor General, the SIRC or the CSE Commissioner, I have asked myself "is there some reason why they possess the range of powers they have and the CPC doesn't? Is there a need to shelter the RCMP from this degree of oversight for fear that it would somehow negatively impact upon their ability to fulfill their important public safety function?" To answer that question, it is useful to look at civilian oversight of the police function in other western democracies, in particular those that flow out of the British common law tradition.

In the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia, we see police oversight bodies that are active participants in the police investigation; participants with the authority to supervise, oversee or manage police investigations, as well as conduct investigations on their own, some of which are not subject to appeal and contain binding findings.

Take for example Australia where police corruption has recently driven the creation of six oversight bodies, many that have the power to mount technical operations, develop human sources, and hold public hearings prior to criminal proceedings.

Across the Commonwealth we see a magnitude of legislative changes that have been adopted over the past twenty years. In all cases the creation of the police oversight bodies and the legislative changes that enhanced the scope of powers translated into benefits for the state of policing and the citizens.

Is there any suggestion that the police forces of these countries have been weakened in their ability to effectively discharge their responsibilities? Has there been a lessening of or an increase in public support for the police? I would argue no. Has there been a diminishment of certain kinds of concerns? I would argue yes.

Northern Ireland provides a unique look into the role and importance of police oversight. Borne out of the turbulent years of civil unrest in the 70s, 80s and 90s, the work of the Northern Ireland Police Ombudsman is daunting, to say the least.

However, since its creation in 2000, annual polling illustrates an increase in public perception and support for the police and the oversight body.

For example, 2008 polls indicate that public awareness of the police Ombudsman grew from 65 percent in 2001 to 90 percent in 2008, and that 70 percent of police officers investigated by the Police Ombudsman were 'very satisfied' or 'satisfied' with the service they received.

Also of interest is the way people are complaining. In 2000/01 30 percent of complaints were made directly to the Ombudsman, whereas 54 percent were made to the police service. Today, the trend has reversed: 55 percent of complaints are being made to the Ombudsman and 29 percent are made to the police.

This is occurring in Canada as well as today approximately 60 percent of all complaints against the RCMP come to the CPC first. This was not the case a mere three years ago.

If there has been no reduction in the ability of the police to successfully discharge their role in the face of strong civilian oversight, why then are we seemingly so reluctant in Canada to enhance our current oversight model at the national level?

Several provincial governments have brought about change to the legislation covering police oversight at least once since the creation of their police oversight body. In most cases, changes were prompted in response to public outcry.

For example current legislative developments in Manitoba are a response to Justice Salhany's report on the Taman Inquiry, and in Saskatchewan the release of the Stonechild Inquiry prompted the creation of the Police Complaints Commission there. Legislative changes appear to be coming soon in British Columbia, and Alberta recently adjusted its system.

In most cases, the implemented changes had a direct impact on the state of policing in the environment in question. In all cases, the changes translated into benefits.

I fear similar movement at the national level is not keeping pace.

As I indicated at the outset of my remarks, the concepts of transparency and accountability are firmly entrenched within the consciousness of western democracies. I believe that there is an irresistible tide of growing public expectation that governments will respond to public concerns in this important area.

I was heartened to note that the Speech from the Throne on November 19, 2008 included a commitment by the Government to table a national security statement to explain how it intends to balance the new threats and challenges to national security that we face with the need for oversight, accountability and the protection of civil liberties. I look forward to hearing from the panel members and audience questions throughout the day. I would like to know if there really is a tide of expectations and what our response should be.

Lawrence J. Peter, author of The Peter Principle, observed that a "Bureaucracy defends the status quo long past the time when the quo has lost its status." Looking back over the 34 years since the establishment of the Marin Commission, that observation has a certain resonance. I would hope that the contribution of panellists today will help inform a debate that will move us from inadequate civilian oversight to a model of appropriate, effective and meaningful oversight in respect of the RCMP.

Thank you.