APEC – Commission Interim Report
12. Police Performance
I have concluded that the real explanation for what appeared to be a police "crackdown" on protests was the RCMP's failure to meet an acceptable and expected standard of competence, professionalism and proficiency in carrying out their duties. In this chapter, I will consider the evidence relating to several incidents of sub-standard performance. In subsequent chapters, I will review in detail the specific police conduct involved in the 17 categories of complaint.
12.1.1. The November 24 Briefing
On November 24, the morning before the APEC leaders' meeting, front line security personnel were brought together at UBC for a briefing on their duties for the following day. Four officers were designated as Zone Commanders and briefed on their supervisory duties over the officers to be assigned to them. They were given the information police had gathered that there would be attempts to breach the security fence and that their duty was to maintain the integrity of that fence. They were informed about the resources that would be available should an incident occur and that video personnel would be on hand to capture any incidents on tape.
Although the briefing was limited by the extent of the background knowledge held by Supt. Thompsett and his colleagues (he was not fully aware of the planned demonstration to follow the march to the flagpole), nevertheless it seemed very much in accord with the view of expert witnesses as to what should occur at this stage.
Chief Supt. French said the briefing process is crucial because:
... unless we brief our people about what it is we want them to do, and how we want them to do it, then we will fail. So briefing is one of the most important elements of the whole process.
Unfortunately, because of what happened the next morning, many of the officers who were briefed on November 24 were unavailable to take up their posts on the big day.
12.1.2. The November 25 Briefing
On the morning of November 25, 131 officers were expected for a 6:00 a.m. briefing on campus similar to the one held the previous day. Those expected included the Zone Commanders and others who had been at the November 24 briefing, as well as many more security personnel who would, on that morning, be briefed for the first time. By the 6:00 a.m. start time only 30 to 40 of the 131 officers who were expected had arrived. Previously selected Zone Commanders were absent and replacements had to be appointed. The 30 to 40 present were briefed pretty much along the lines of the previous day's briefing.
12.1.3. Stray Buses
What happened on November 25 was that, because of a misrouting of buses, key personnel who had been briefed the day before were absent as the day began. Some officers who were unprepared for what would unfold that day were quickly briefed at the last minute and sent off to take the place of others who were to have filled those positions. Some received assignments as Zone Commanders at that time.
Insp. Perry Edwards explained the confusion by the fact that the bus drivers who were to bring the personnel to the campus for the 6:00 a.m. briefing instead insisted on taking them to RCMP headquarters on Heather Street:
... basically what happened was that the bus drivers who were tasked with bringing the members to UBC decided that they knew where they were supposed to go, that is, RCMP Headquarters at 33rd and Heather, ... they made their decisions, and even though the members told them, "No, we know where we've been tasked. We're supposed to go to UBC."' "No, no, we're taking you to "E" Division Headquarters". By the time that all got sorted out and they got back on the buses and ferried out to UBC, the clock was very much ticking on the arrival of the first motorcade, and the result was we really almost ran them into the briefing room, went through the list of who was in what zone, because there was changes between the first and second days, significant numbers of people who were being changed and made them aware of where they were working, I think showed them basically a chart like that, and said, okay. This is zone 1, 2, 3 or west/east, and away you go. And – because we had to get them in place and because the motorcades were, you know, expected.
Q: So you didn't get a chance to go into any detail about your plans and how to deal with demonstrations at UBC?
A: No.
12.1.4. Replacement Personnel
Cpl. David Flamank was designated on November 25 as Zone Commander for Zone 3, which included Gate 6. This was the only day he had any involvement with the APEC conference. In early November, he had been instructed to attend at 6:00 a.m. on November 25 to perform security duties on campus. His regular duties were as a forensic identification specialist at the Surrey Detachment. He had no training or experience dealing with crowds or demonstrations. Cpl. Flamank said that he was appointed a Zone Commander because the person who had been delegated to that role was absent. He said he was assigned 20 to 25 RCMP members but, in reality, when he left for Zone 3, only one other officer was available to go with him. He was given a map of the area and a portable radio. His instructions were to patrol the fence in his zone and make sure no unauthorized persons were allowed on the secure side of the fence. He said he received no instructions about what to do if crowds formed in an area within or adjacent to his zone. He said that other officers assigned to his zone filtered in within the next two hours and that Sgt. Robert Beaudoin was one of them. The two officers shared the Zone Commander responsibilities for the rest of the day. Besides the two Zone Commanders, approximately four officers were posted at Gate 6 during the morning.
The Zone Commanders were intended to be part of the management structure for the day with the Site Commander and the Deputy Site Commanders as their superior officers. Interestingly, when Supt. Thompsett was asked at the hearing whether he knew Cpl. Flamank, he said the name did not mean anything to him. That, I am satisfied, is because of the circumstances under which Cpl. Flamank's appointment occurred, and specifically the confusion over who would be assigned to the designated zones on the campus. Cpl. Flamank was present when Gate 6 was cleared late in the afternoon. More will be said about that in Chapter 28.
S/Sgt. Jerry Moloci, also from the Surrey Detachment, was also designated as a Zone Commander on the morning of November 25. He said Supt. Thompsett recognized him and told him that he would be in charge of Zone 1, which included the Green College area, and that he would be given 20 members to patrol the area. Prior to that moment, S/Sgt. Moloci was unaware that he would be in charge of a zone. After the briefing, S/Sgt. Moloci set off with 10 members, as the remaining 10 had not yet arrived. He said they dribbled in during the course of the day – sporadically, not all at once. S/Sgt. Moloci said that, while he was generally aware of the campus layout, he did not know it well as he really had never spent any time looking it over. He was given a map of the zone. There was a constable in S/Sgt. Moloci's contingent of 10 who had been at the briefing the day before. S/Sgt. Moloci said the constable "kind of knew the area and took me and showed me where it was because I didn't know what it looked like." S/Sgt. Moloci became quite involved in the events outside Green College during the morning of November 25. More will be said about that in Chapter 21.
Insp. Edwards acknowledged that it would have been better to have had full briefings but he did not consider the many absences to be a major problem because he and Insp. Larry Killaly and the Zone Commanders were in the field to lend supervisory assistance. Nevertheless, as a consideration of the complaints will show, there were negative consequences throughout the day that flowed from the absence of the full contingent of security personnel at the 6:00 a.m. briefing.
Green College is a campus residence for graduate students. It sits on the north side of Northwest Marine Drive across from the law school, not far from where Northwest Marine Drive merges with Chancellor Boulevard at Gate 3.
The security fence was placed along the curb on the Green College side of Northwest Marine Drive and then down Cecil Green Park Road, leaving an open space consisting of a sidewalk and grassy area in front of the Green College buildings. Although the area allowed less space for protesters than was provided in front of the law school, it allowed for much closer access to the leaders. Anyone in the area in front of Green College would have access to the fence at the curb and, thus, be very close to the motorcades passing along Northwest Marine Drive as they made their way to and from the museum.
Students going to class on the main campus on November 25 needed access across Northwest Marine Drive so a system was put in place to gather students at a check point and escort them across to the campus. No such movement was to be allowed while the motorcades were arriving or departing.
The fence was constructed on Saturday morning, November 22. It was described as secondary fencing, eight feet high but without a concrete base. It was placed along the curb as that was thought to be the most stable area. The fence represented the security line that was not to be crossed by protesters and other unaccredited persons.
At some time before November 22, the location of the fence in front of Green College was determined by the RCMP. The revised Schedule A to the Licence Agreement, signed on the evening of November 22, showed the fence in the location where it had been constructed that morning. A campus map, showing the finalized security perimeter in the heavy black line, is attached as Appendix V to this report.
The fence placed the Green College buildings and the space in front of them outside the security zone and both Supt. Thompsett and Supt. May acknowledged that to be so. Supt. Thompsett and Insp. Edwards inspected the fence on Sunday morning, November 23.
12.2.1. Warning Signs
It was widely known that there was some opposition to APEC amongst the students in residence at Green College. In the days leading up to November 25, the RCMP should have been alerted to the fact that Green College could very well be an active protest location, for several reasons:
- A number of signs expressing that opposition appeared in the windows of Green College several days before the APEC leaders' meeting and were in prominent display on November 25;
- The "F*CK APEC" sign, lit with Christmas tree lights, was seen and commented upon by many persons; and
- On Saturday morning, November 22, a graduate student and Green College resident, Karen Pearlston, went out to put signs on the security fence along Cecil Green Park Road. Her signs displayed slogans including "APEC off Campus;" "secret RCMP off campus;" and "Green College is for ideas and friendship not APEC."
RCMP personnel on site that morning ordered the removal of Ms. Pearlston's signs. She protested but the RCMP prevailed. I accept Ms. Pearlston's evidence that an officer told her that the removal was due to orders from the Prime Minister's Office that there should be "no signs and no people" on that side of the street. Both VPD and RCMP officers were present at the time but the officer who spoke to Ms. Pearlston was never identified. This evidence cannot, on its own, be relied upon as a basis for concluding that the Prime Minister had in fact ordered signs down.
With several RCMP officers present during the Pearlston incident, should not a warning sign have gone up that protests in the area in front of Green College on the morning of November 25 were virtually assured? I would think so.
Similar signals arose on Sunday evening, November 23. Craig Jones, another Green College resident, taped nine 8½ by 11 inch sheets of paper spelling "DEMOCRACY" to the same fence. The next morning he posted similar signs, one spelling "FREE SPEECH" and the other "HUMAN RIGHTS." Late in the evening of November 24, RCMP officers ordered the removal of the signs. Mr. Jones unsuccessfully challenged this order to Supt. Thompsett and the signs were removed and returned to him. He taped one of them to the sidewalk and took the other two to his residence in Green College where the officers knew he lived. Should not another warning sign have gone up that Mr. Jones was likely to reappear outside his residence with his signs on the morning of November 25? Again, I would think so. In fact, Mr. Jones did just that.
12.2.2. A Gap in Planning
As should have been expected by the RCMP, some students gathered on the sidewalk and lawn at 8:00 a.m. on November 25 and awaited the arrival of the motorcades. Some carried signs, most of an anti-APEC variety. It was because of those signs that a confrontation with the RCMP occurred. Signs were seized and Mr. Jones was arrested.
In their closing written submission, counsel for the 44 RCMP officers said that "... no one for a moment considered that protesters could be at the Green College Site." Surely those charged with providing security services should have known that protests at Green College were a virtual certainty. Dozens of RCMP officers passed by the fence in front of Green College on November 22, 23 and 24 and several of them directed their attention towards the College. The warning signs were there.
Counsel for the 44 RCMP members also said that "[n]o one ever . . . said that protesting could occur in front of Green College." Yet it was understood and acknowledged by everyone, including the RCMP, that protesting could occur anywhere outside the secure zone.
Counsel for the 44 RCMP members frankly acknowledged that the evidence showed that: "[a]s a matter of planning, barring protest from the front of Green College beforehand slipped through the cracks." One officer referred to a "gap" in the planning while another saw it as an "oversight" that demonstrations had not been anticipated there. As a result of this oversight, according to counsel for the 44 RCMP members, at approximately 8:00 a.m. on November 25, Green College, where the motorcades would pass so closely by the security fence, was "the most vulnerable location in the whole of APEC."
What occurred during the confrontation, including the seizure of signs and the arrest of Mr. Jones, is discussed in Chapter 21.
Soon after noon on November 25, some 2,500 to 3,000 protesters moved up the Main Mall towards the security fence that had been constructed at the flagpole near the Rose Garden. They were chanting "Students are here to keep the peace – watch the actions of police."
Less than half an hour before they arrived at the security fence, a decision was made to allow the protesters unobstructed access to the fence, in spite of a long-standing plan that had called for that access to be blocked by a cordon of police officers.
When the protesters arrived at their destination and found no officers between them and the fence, some of them jumped on the concrete base, pulling on the fence. It collapsed almost immediately, trapping beneath it some of the protesters and some others who had rushed in from the sides when they saw the calamity at hand. Bedlam broke out, pepper spray was dispersed, arrests were made and tensions rose as the police struggled to gain control. Many complaints were made about police conduct in this period and they are reviewed in Chapter 23.
The decision to allow the protesters direct access to the security fence may have been the most significant of many policing decisions that were made that day. The circumstances surrounding its making speak volumes about the inadequate state of police readiness to deal with a demonstration that they had known for some time was scheduled to take place at this location and at this time.
12.3.1. Police Resources
I am satisfied that adequate police resources were assembled at the Rose Garden to deal with the march that would be the culminating event of what had been advertised as "Crash the Summit."
The Quick Response Teams and two tactical units were on hand, as well as approximately 130 RCMP officers serving as security personnel in the four zones that had been established. Each zone had its own commander who had responsibility for 30 to 40 officers. These officers were stationed all along the security fence, including the flagpole area, most of them on the public side, explaining to those nearby that the fence was a boundary that they were not to cross.
At the flagpole, on the public side of the fence, were more than 150 members of the Quick Response Teams, including 60 VPD members on mountain bikes, all under the command of S/Sgt. Hugh Stewart. Their specific purpose was to provide security at the point where the marchers were expected to approach the fence.
In addition to the Quick Response Teams, there were many RCMP officers located on the inside (secure side) of the fence at this location.
On standby and out of sight in the Rose Garden parkade were the two tactical units:
- the RCMP National Capital Regional Tactical Troop of about 60 members, as primary responder; and
- the VPD Crowd Control Unit of about 70 members, as secondary responder and support.
The VPD Crowd Control Unit deployed at two levels:
- At level one, members wear a soft hat with "Police" on it, crowd control coveralls, regular issue VPD nylon jacket and a side arm.
- At level two, members wear a hard had (helmet with visor), no side arm, a gas respirator bag, an outer vest with protective padding for upper body, groin and spine, and a 36-inch or 24-inch wood baton. Some are also equipped with a clear plastic shield 36 inches long by 24 inches wide.
The RCMP National Capital Region Tactical Troop respond only in level two attire.
12.3.2. The Protesters' Plans
The protesters did not expect that they would be allowed unobstructed access to the security fence. Sabrina Bonfonti, who was among those at the front of the march, was one of those who testified as to the protesters' intentions:
...we anticipated walking up to the police and had the impression that even by leaning into them slightly we would be arrested, most likely. And that – so that's what we were expecting so that's why we were really confused when they left.
Q: So when you saw the police that was in front of the fence, initially your intention was to go up to them and lean and be arrested?
A: Yes.
Q: All right. And how far were you from them when they moved out of the way?
A: Just fairly close, like, a foot.
Q: Okay. And did that happen right away or was there a – was there anything else that occurred?
A: There – there wasn't much of a standoff, like it was pretty much as we got up to them
Q: Yeah?
A: ––like we had hardly stopped moving, like they just turned right as we approached them.
Q: Okay. So what happened then?
A: Then we stood there for a minute because we were, like the people that I was linked arms with, we were kind of, sort of looking at each other like, well, what are we gonna do now because the whole idea was that there was gonna be a line of police and we'd lean into them but now they're not there. So, just kind of, I mean there wasn't a large meeting or anything but by talking to the people on either side we said, well, we're standing in front of the fence, so let's – I bet if we start to climb on the fence that they'll come back and arrest us then.
Q: Okay.
A: So, that's what we did.
Q: So that was decided upon and – and you in fact did exactly that; is that correct?
A: Yes. I myself didn't get very much onto the fence, I reached up with two hands but then it – that's when it fell.
I am satisfied that Ms. Bonfonti's testimony reflected the attitude and intention of an overwhelming majority of protesters as they approached the security fence that day. They would come to the RCMP line and apply pressure in what would be a futile attempt to get through the line but would result in many arrests. That was the planned civil disobedience. It was the manner in which the protesters, in full glare of the media, were going to make their dissent known with respect to APEC and the objectionable things, from their perspective, for which it stood.
But if the protesters thought that they would be permitted to tie up police resources by presenting scores of bodies to be arrested, they were mistaken. After all, the primary police responsibility on that day was to protect the international visitors then on site. In fact, later in the afternoon when protesters tried similar tactics, police made a reasonable number of arrests and then called a halt. The protesters accepted that there would be no more arrests and sought other avenues of protest. If police had taken a similar approach to the protesters at the flagpole, rather than withdrawing their officers from the fence, the incidents that led to so many complaints might have been avoided.
12.3.3. Police Information about Protesters' Plans
The protesters' intentions to bump into the police at the fence line were no secret from the police. Also, there were indications that a much smaller number of protesters would try to actually breach the security fence and the RCMP anticipated that such attempts would be made.
Cpl. Keith Boutilier was in charge of the Analytical Intelligence Unit of the National Security Intelligence Service for the APEC conference. This unit's mandate was to collect and analyze information from a variety of sources for two purposes:
- to identify any real or perceived threat against any of the Internationally Protected Persons; and
- to identify which individuals or groups might use the APEC conference as a forum for their protests.
Cpl. Boutilier was asked what information the Threat Assessment Group had passed on to the RCMP in respect of the anticipated protests at UBC. He said that their information suggested that a core group of people were going to participate in what protesters had described as "civil disobedience, vigorous non-violent, protest action." They knew that a core group was prepared to be arrested and that in fact some of these individuals were arrested for their anti-APEC activities in the days leading up to the meeting itself. Cpl. Boutilier said:
A: So with all those factors being taken into consideration, our evaluation for the security details packages at UBC, was that there was strong indication that some of these protestors were certainly going to present problems to the security details, in their efforts to breach or enter the security zones.
Q: Did you receive information from Corporal Chrustie that the protestors for the main demonstration, if police were not on the inside of the fence, but were on the outside, intended to go up to the fence and blow bubbles through the fence?
A: I had no knowledge of that.
Cpl. Boutilier agreed that the following would be an accurate summary of the information passed on to the RCMP: On the one hand, there was no real or perceived threat to any of the IPP's, but on the other hand, you had better be well prepared to deal with protests, including protests where you may have to arrest individuals engaging in civil disobedience.
Many intelligence reports were distributed to key RCMP personnel. The report distributed early on the morning of November 25 contained information that APEC Alert's protests would be focused at UBC that day and that the group planned to organize at the Student Union Building at 7 a.m. The report also relayed information that between 9:00 and 11:00 a.m. the group would gather at the Goddess of Democracy statue, near the Student Union Building, with activities to include a "mock trial" of President Suharto. They were expecting to be joined by students from other local campuses, who would arrive by bus. Between 11:00 a.m. and noon they planned to march through the campus down the Main Mall to Norman Mackenzie House, stopping to perform a skit in front of the security detail. Further, the report contained the following note:
Important: Very reliable information indicates 15 protesters from East Timor Alert Network (ETAN) have agreed to breach the security fence. Their strategy is to go in groups of five at separate times to different sections of the fence. Anticipated start time is 09:30 hrs. Departure point is the Goddess of Democracy. At 5:30 a.m. on November 25, an APEC Duty Officer Briefing Report in Command Centre recorded similar information.
Supt. Casey, who was in joint command at Command Centre, agreed that at 6:00 a.m. the police had information that, beginning at 9:30 that morning, there would be "waves of students trying to attack security at UBC.... The first wave five plus students, attention seeking, will happen minimum three times today. Always in front of the media."
At 11:00 a.m. the police had received reports that "some 300 plus students are planning to march to the flagpole at the UBC to stage a die-in. This action is a part of the planned protest events. Indications are that the only offensive tactics that they will use against the police is to get in their way by bumping into them."
S/Sgt. Stewart, who was out at the fence, was quite aware of this information. He and several others testified that they understood there would be three attempts to breach the fence that day. S/Sgt. Stewart said:
There was a considerable amount of intelligence that was brought forward, sir. There was intelligence that suggested that there would be three attempts on the fence. That there would be an attempt to surreptitiously cut the fencing in one location, and for a number of persons to break through. That there were persons intent upon physically arresting Mr. Suharto. So yes, sir, I did have some intelligence in that regard.
In fact, for a long time Supt. May had known a great deal about the plans for student demonstrations on November 25. Given his APEC related responsibilities which began in 1996 and required his full-time involvement through 1997, there should have been no surprises for the RCMP that morning insofar as demonstrations were concerned. Supt. May agreed that he had been aware of the anti-APEC sentiments being expressed on campus and that there were plans in place weeks, or even months, in advance of November 25 for a major demonstration near the flagpole. Further, he and his associates had known for a considerable length of time about the protesters' plans to bump into the police line at the fence.
Site Commander Supt. Thompsett testified as to his expectations. Given the anticipated breach of the security fence, he said that the fence at this point was "going to be manned in the sense that there will be police officers positioned along this fence."
12.3.4. Relationship between Police and Protesters
Sgt. McLaren, who was present as the march approached the fence, said the demonstrators were in high spirits, well organized and peaceful. In the days preceding November 25 there had been many orderly demonstrations and protests in downtown Vancouver in which the leadership of the protesting groups worked with the police to the benefit of both protesters and police. Supt. May expressed the general policy of the RCMP when planning events of this kind:
Generally, we meet with the organizers to determine what their objectives are and if there's any way we can assist them in meeting those objectives, while at the same time, making them aware of what our obligations are to protect the IPP's. In other words, we try to work with them, and--to ensure that we both reach the objectives that we set out to achieve.
I consider this to be a very sound policy which should be continued in the future.
There were, however, a few people involved in the leadership core of APEC Alert whose attitude was bitter and hostile towards what they saw as APEC's purpose. This attitude spilled over into antagonism and ill will towards the police and made the policing task far more difficult than it otherwise would have been.
Cst. Charles A. Breakey, who worked with the protest groups under the guidance and direction of Cpl. Boutilier, described APEC Alert as the only group of protesters that was overtly uncooperative. I am satisfied that the leaders of APEC Alert were uncooperative, although those in that category declined to acknowledge holding leadership responsibilities. In my judgment, the RCMP made reasonable efforts to make their policy work and any responsibility for a failure to establish a cooperative working rapport with APEC Alert does not rest with the RCMP.
12.3.5. The Police Decision to Move Away from the Fence
I now turn to consider what prompted the RCMP to move away from the security fence where Ms. Bonfonti, her associates and Supt. Thompsett had expected them to remain. This involves a consideration of the role, responsibilities and performance of Supt. Thompsett and the two deputies he had appointed to assist him.
12.3.5.1. The contingency plan
As November arrived, Supt. Thompsett remained in Chilliwack, fulfilling his responsibilities as District Officer for the Southwest Division. As I have mentioned, Supt. Thompsett's was a senior position with supervisory responsibilities over 24 detachments including large urban detachments in the lower mainland. As I understand it, other than that of the Commanding Officer, this is the most senior RCMP position in "E" Division which encompassed the whole of British Columbia.
On November 9, Insp. Dingwall e-mailed Supt. Thompsett to ask if he had found an officer to prepare a "demo/passive resistance contingency plan." Insp. Dingwall explained at the hearing that a contingency plan is intended to deal with potential problems that could arise at an event, and to focus those with responsibility on all the potential "hot spots" and problems so that the best security package possible would be in place to deal with attempts to breach security. That same day, Supt. Thompsett asked S/Sgt. Stewart to prepare the contingency plan, pointing out that this document would fall under Staff Sgt. Stewart's mandate. Although S/Sgt. Stewart intended to prepare the plan, he was told by his immediate supervisor, Insp. Forsythe, that this was not within his area of responsibility. S/Sgt. Stewart explained:
I was reminded by Inspector Forsythe that that would be inappropriate because there was a number of sites asking us to develop plans, that I had not been aware of and that the plans were the responsibility of the Site Commander and that he would be speaking directly to Superintendent Thompsett in that regard. And that I wasn't to develop the plan.
In his November 9 e-mail, Insp. Dingwall had identified a number of officers without APEC responsibilities who could be brought on board to assist Supt. Thompsett, including Insps. Killaly and Edwards. Supt. Thompsett contacted each of them. Insp. Killaly was on holiday and not expected to return until about November 15. Insp. Edwards volunteered for whatever duties Supt. Thompsett wished to assign to him. They met in Vancouver on November 13 and Insp. Edwards was instructed to prepare the contingency plan, setting out the RCMP response to potential protests and demonstrations on November 25. Insp. Edwards said he prepared a draft plan at the RCMP UBC Detachment office on the evening of November 22. It seems that the draft was read and approved orally by Supt. Thompsett. However, as time was getting short, the document never went any further and did not go through the approval process that had been put in place many months before.
Insp. Killaly came to UBC on November 20 to take up whatever duties Supt. Thompsett had for him. Insp. Killaly said that all he did was glance at the draft and that a meeting to discuss it never occurred. No further attention was paid to the document due to the shortage of time before the leaders' meeting.
12.3.5.2. Deputy Site Commanders
Supt. Thompsett, as Site Commander, fixed Insps. Killaly and Edwards with further and very important responsibilities. Realizing that he would need assistance in the field on November 25, he appointed the two men as Operations or Incident Commanders. These appointments were made some time between November 20 and 22. Supt. Thompsett described their duties and responsibilities as being:
... if an incident or event occurred during the course of the – of the day at UBC or before, the day before, whatever, that required a police response, these two gentlemen would be responsible for going to that particular incident and taking command of the incident on the front line.
While it was clear that Supt. Thompsett would be available to consult with the Inspectors if necessary, they were nevertheless empowered to make full and final decisions with the same level of authority as Supt. Thompsett himself had as overall Site Commander. In effect, they were deputy Site Commanders with full authority to take charge in respect of any incident and to make whatever decisions they felt the circumstances warranted.
S/Sgt. Stewart, who had considerable interaction with both Inspectors on November 25, correctly understood his and their role and rank in the chain of command, particularly with respect to where he stood as Commander of the Quick Response Teams. S/Sgt.
Stewart said:
Everyone at the site, sir, fell under the Site Commander Supt. Trevor Thompsett and his two Operational Commanders, Insp. Killaly and Insp. Edwards. And we all took our direction from them.
He also said:
No one takes action, unless it's under the direction of the Site Commander. You have no freedom of command in that type of situation, sir. You do not act on your own volition.
He was asked again about the chain of command:
Q: Okay. Was it your understanding, then, that when you were at UBC that you would take direction from Members of the Site Management structure?
A: Absolutely.
Q: And who did you anticipate that would be?
A: We anticipated it would be either Edwards or Killaly, or on occasion, Superintendent Thompsett.
S/Sgt. Stewart was not involved in the overall decision making process for the events of November 25. He emphasized, quite correctly, that his involvement was with the Quick Response Teams and that he did not have charge of the site. He and his teams were there to respond, under the direction of the Site Commander, his Deputies and Command Centre. He at no time saw the UBC site plan nor the contingency plan drafted by Insp. Edwards for demonstrations and protests.
12.3.5.3. The security fence
The fencing at the flagpole location was described as "Indy" style. About 10 to 12 feet high, it was constructed of chain link wire mesh attached with light weight plastic ties to upright steel poles. The poles sat in holes within cement blocks set on the ground.
Supt. May was responsible for the selection of the type of fencing used. He had no knowledge of how it was to be secured to the cement blocks and he did not personally inspect the fence after it was installed because that was the responsibility of the Site Commander, Supt. Thompsett.
Supt. Thompsett did make a tour of the fencing. It was completed on Saturday evening, November 22, and he toured it Sunday morning with Insp. Edwards.
Unfortunately, the fence construction had at least three deficiencies that threatened its utility for its intended purpose of keeping unauthorized persons out of the secure zone:
- the plastic ties attaching the wire mesh to the poles were inadequate;
- the bottom of the fence was left unsecured and could be lifted up, allowing passage under the fence and over the concrete block or curb; and
- the lack of horizontal wiring through the fence at the bottom, middle and top left the fence quite unstable and liable to collapse if anyone were to pull on it.
Supt. Thompsett took steps to have airplane wire attached horizontally across the bottom of the fence, intertwining it with the upright poles. That was sufficient to prevent protesters from lifting the bottom of the fence and preventing entry over the top of the concrete blocks. The other two deficiencies were never corrected. That is to say, the weak plastic ties were left in place and horizontal wire was not attached at the middle or top of the fence. Supt. May did not become aware of these deficiencies until the unfolding of the events of November 25. He said that the fence, with its deficiencies, certainly did not meet his expectations.
S/Sgt. Stewart did not inspect the fence. Like Supt. May, he saw that as Supt. Thompsett's responsibility. S/Sgt. Stewart said he assumed that it was properly constructed and had been examined.
Insp. Killaly said he did not inspect the fence other than walking around to look at it.
Insp. Edwards was aware of the steps taken by Supt. Thompsett to secure the bottom of the fence. As to the possibility of the fence being pulled open at the top and coming down, he said that, although he did not consider that possibility further, he knew that site security officers would be present and he expected that they would intervene if someone tried to gain entry to the secure zone by pulling down the fence.
Sgt. Anderson was aware of the problem but considered that the installation of the extra wiring across the bottom of the fence was sufficient. VPD Insp. Ken Doern said he told Supt. Thompsett and Insp. Edwards on Sunday evening, November 23, that he did not believe that the newly installed bottom wire sufficiently dealt with the fence deficiencies. He believes that he likely communicated the same to Insp. Killaly the next day. He said that, on the evening of November 24 at the Beatty Street Armouries where the Quick Response Teams assembled each day, he had expressed his concerns about the fence to S/Sgt. Stewart.
Supt. Thompsett continued to consider whether the fence was stable enough to serve its purpose, even after the bottom had been strengthened with the wire. He said that he had not forgotten about the plastic ties, but felt that even though he was not totally satisfied with them, obviously someone had approved the fence construction and decided that this was the way it would be.
Having secured the bottom of the fence, and given the short time frame and his understanding that RCMP officers would be positioned all along the fence, Supt. Thompsett did not pursue the matter further. That was the state of affairs as the marchers approached the fence.
12.3.5.4. A change in plans
I return to the events at the flagpole before noon hour. As at 11:30 a.m., the police plan was to have the Quick Response Teams, including the Bike Squad component, lined up in front of the fence in the area where the marchers were to arrive. Certainly this was what Site Commander Supt. Thompsett expected.
But between 11:30 a.m. and 11:45 a.m., information came to the RCMP line to the effect that, if there was no RCMP line at the fence, the protesters intended simply to approach and blow bubbles through the fence. This intelligence prompted a decision by someone to move the RCMP line aside and allow protesters unobstructed access to the fence.
Sgt. McLaren testified that about half an hour before the march down the Main Mall, he met with Sgt. Calvin Chrustie and Cst. Leach who told him "that the march was going to take place and the protestors planned on marching to the flagpole towards the fence. If there was an RCMP line at the fence line, their plan was to march with their arms folded across their chest, and that they would bump into the RCMP line looking for some kind of a reaction. If there was no RCMP line at the fence, then their objectives were to go to the fence and symbolically blow some bubbles through the fence." Sgt. McLaren passed that information on to S/Sgt. Stewart.
I have concluded that it was Cst. Leach who obtained this information in his work as a member of the undercover team working under Sgt. Chrustie. I do not know its original source, but it was this information that resulted in a change in RCMP plans at virtually the last minute.
Chief Supt. French said, and I agree, that the question of whether the protesters would have access to the security fence was a planning issue that should have been resolved in advance, not something that should be the subject of a last-minute decision on the ground.
Expert witness Insp. Ernest Ryan, Unit Commander in the Public Safety Division of the Toronto Police Service, testified that because the fence was not a permanent structure, it would have been prudent not to allow access by protesters. He said that RCMP tactics have to be responsive to information as it is received and if there was information to indicate a potential breach, the RCMP needed a fall back position:
And the fence is the... first fall back position. if there's a RCMP line ahead of it. You also have to weigh that against the requirement of the––the demonstrators to – to be positioned to where they're happy with their demonstration.
12.3.5.5. Who decided to allow access to the fence
Other than Command Centre, of whose involvement there was no suggestion, only Supt. Thompsett and Insps. Edwards and Killaly had the authority to make the decision to open access to the fence.
S/Sgt. Stewart was clearly supportive of giving direct access to the fence on the basis of the recently received information about the protesters' bubble plan. He said he expressed that support to Insps. Edwards and Killaly, who were both present at the fence – Insp. Edwards inside, within the secure zone, and Insp. Killaly outside, in the public area. However, I am satisfied that S/Sgt. Stewart did not make the decision. He knew that it was not his to make.
Supt. Thompsett did not make the decision. At the time, he was attending to responsibilities at his command headquarters near the museum. He was neither informed of nor consulted about the "bubbles" theory. In fact, his knowledge of the march itself was scant:
Q: Did you have information as to how the Crash the Summit Demonstration was going to occur in the late morning of November 25th?
A: No, no. Other than it was being referred to as 'Crash the Summit'.
Q: Well did you know there was going to be a demonstration where the protesters were going to march up to the fence near the Rose Garden parkade?
A: No.
Q: You didn't know that?
A: I didn't know exactly what it was. I knew it was going to be a march on –– and I believe at one time there –– I may stand corrected, now maybe there was an occasion when I –– there was going to be a march. I'm not sure if was referred to as the Rose Garden, but there was going to be a march, And I'm not certain exactly where it was going to be, but now that you recall –– or mention it, I think there probably was a reference that they would be meeting at the Democracy and moving towards the –– the site.
Q: Did you provide any briefing information about that plan to the officers on the morning of the November 25th?
A: That they would be coming –– other than that our site is –– the security is going to be breached and that that particular area, in other words, when we look at the area, there's the –– there –– I went through where the areas are and the geographies of it, and we looked at the far side and up there. But I can't recall if I got into any specifics on that. Insp. Killaly did not make the decision. He testified that as far as he knew, the protesters intended to go up to the fence and "shout and holler and whatever, hold up signs, that type of thing." He said that he believed he heard of the decision to allow access to the fence and about the "bubble" plan from Supt. Thompsett, but he was wrong about that. Supt. Thompsett knew nothing about it.
Insp. Edwards was quite blunt that the decision could not have been made by him.
Q: Were you privy to intelligence information about the protestors wanting to blow bubbles through the fence?
A: Blow bubbles?
Q: Yes.
A: I don't recall that one.
Who made the decision to allow the protesters unobstructed access to the fence – perhaps the most significant decision made that day – remains a mystery. In spite of all the well known information gathered by police about the students' plans when they reached the fence, someone relied on the belief that they only intended to blow bubbles through it and on that basis, decided to withdraw the police line and allow access to the fence. Once that happened, the students began to climb on the fence, it fell, and the pepper spray confrontation ensued. Tempting as it is, I hesitate to go so far as to say that the RCMP decision was wrong because I am not privy to the background of the intelligence relating to the "bubbles" theory. I do go so far, however, as to associate myself with the following paragraph in the closing submission of counsel for the B.C. Civil Liberties Association:
Having failed to either select an appropriate fence or adequately reinforce the Indy fencing, the RCMP could still have saved the situation by not allowing the crowd to get close enough to the fence to touch it. This was not done. Based on dubious "intelligence", the RCMP allowed the crowd to approach right up to a fence in which RCMP officers had already identified weaknesses, and despite having supposedly received other intelligence which supposedly indicated that students were planning to breach the fence, and despite knowing in fact that students had expressed their desire to engage in a symbolic arrest of President Suharto, one of the IPPs who was on the other side of the fence. Given those factors, it is a mystery how the RCMP could have failed to foresee that protesters would climb onto the fence and that the fence would collapse.
It was suggested in a question to S/Sgt. Stewart that if the fence had never come down, the situation might never have deteriorated into the confrontation that occurred that day. He agreed, and so do I.
12.3.6. An Impossible Position
Supt. Thompsett and Insps. Edwards and Killaly were put in an impossible position. Supt. Thompsett was given far less time than was necessary to meet the major responsibilities that the role of Site Commander placed upon him. Insps. Edwards and Killaly had no knowledge, when November arrived, that they would even be involved in the APEC conference at all, and yet they were given weighty responsibilities on very short notice. They lacked the background knowledge gathered over several months which was all reposed with those who were involved in the planning of the event and who, due to the structure created by the RCMP, were not involved in putting the plan into effect.
There may be situations where such a structure is appropriate. This was not one of them. I reach that conclusion for the reasons expressed by Chief Supt. French as recorded in Chapter 5 of this report. The inappropriateness of the planning/delivery dichotomy was made clear by Insp. Dingwall who incorrectly believed that he retained a command function at UBC on November 25. He was questioned about whether there was a difference of opinion between him and Insps. Killaly and Edwards about certain security risks that day:
A: What I will say is that I was on APEC for 15 months in the planning stages. The other two Deputy Operations Commanders were brought in, I suspect, maybe 10 days before the event ––
Q: Who are we talking about, Killaly and Edwards?
A: That's right. And one of the –– in fact, I suspect that –– and I believe I suggested them along with probably five or six others that could fulfill that role, their knowledge base about APEC, whether you're talking in general or specific, was different than mine. Exactly!
12.3.6.1. The Crowd Control Unit
There was considerable activity around the fence line at the flagpole about the time it was decided to allow the protesters access to the fence. Just before the noon hour, Insp. Edwards was approached by Insp. Doern. Insp. Doern was concerned about his ability to deploy his Crowd Control Unit from its "out of sight location" in a timely manner if the fence were breached and the crowd were to rush forward toward the museum. At this point, the two Inspectors watched the crowd growing and thought the protesters were becoming fairly strident. Insp. Edwards described the advice he was given by Insp. Doern as follows:
My advice is we get the Crowd Control Unit out across the Plaza there, both for the reasons of being in place, should the fence get breached and also I think it's fair to say in my mind, was that you are also sending a bit of a message to the crowd. You know, you're there, you're behind the fence, that's okay. If you come across the fence and try to get through it's not going to happen anyway. You're going to have another line of RCMP officers to--to deal with and clearly, you are going to be stopped from going down. If you have serious intentions of going towards the Conference site or that, it's not going to happen, so––
Insp. Edwards then authorized, as he was empowered to do, the presence of the VPD Crowd Control Unit on the plaza. At about noon, Insp. Doern led his unit, dressed in "level one" attire, into the secure zone. They formed up facing the fence with the protesters gathering on the other side. They were one long line of 70 officers.
Insp. Doern observed the crowd grow quieter after the arrival of the unit. However, less than 10 minutes later, he was told by Insp. Dingwall to return the unit to its "out of sight location." Insp. Doern said he voiced his disagreement to Insp. Dingwall. As the unit was under RCMP control he complied, although he was upset and resentful of the order. Insp. Doern said he knew that Insp. Dingwall was neither the Site Commander nor the Assistant Site Commander.
Insp. Dingwall explained to the hearing that he did not want to create a confrontational situation by making the area look like an armed camp. He said he consulted with Insp. Edwards and S/Sgt. Stewart before the VPD Crowd Control Unit was sent away.
It is apparent that S/Sgt. Stewart did not favour the presence of the unit but the decision was not his to make. Insp. Edwards said he did not change his view but that he was essentially overruled. He thought the decision had come from Command Centre after perhaps a telephone call by either S/Sgt. Stewart or Insp. Dingwall. Insp. Edwards said he was surprised at being overruled as he would have thought that the flow would have been through Supt. Thompsett as Site Commander.
There was no reason or need for Insp. Dingwall to have injected himself into this matter. It was likely his view that, given his 15 months of involvement in the planning process, he was in a more knowledgeable position than Insp. Edwards and, therefore, his involvement was justified. However, as he was not in the chain of command, it was not.
There was a sharp difference of opinion at the hearing as to whether the VPD Crowd Control Unit was brought out again after the fence had collapsed. Both Insp. Doern and Insp. Edwards believed that it was not. Insp. Killaly did not recall a second appearance. In contrast, S/Sgt. Stewart was definite in the view that the unit returned after the fence came down. He was supported in that by Cst. Robert J. Fulks, Sgt. McLaren and Cst. Ronald Bieg. That was also the very definite view of two of the protesters who were on the public side of the fence at this point in time.
12.4.1. Exit Routes
There were three possible exit routes from the Museum of Anthropology where the 18 APEC leaders were meeting on November 25, 1997:
- From the museum, left onto Northwest Marine Drive, past Gate 3 and then straight ahead along Chancellor Boulevard, which becomes 4th Avenue;
- From the museum, left onto Northwest Marine Drive, past Gate 3 and then veering left to continue on Northwest Marine and down towards the oceanfront; or
- From the museum, right onto Northwest Marine Drive, which ultimately becomes Southwest Marine Drive, past Gate 6 and on out of the campus.
The longstanding plan had been for the motorcades to leave by the first-described route although a few were to leave by the third route, going directly to the airport.
12.4.2. The Students' Plan
About 2:00 p.m., the protesters began a trek from the flagpole area, past the law school building, through the Vancouver School of Theology grounds to the point where Chancellor Boulevard, a four-lane roadway with a wide grass median, intersects with Theology Mall to the south and Newton Crescent to the north. At that point, the fence forming the south boundary of the secure zone ended, allowing full access onto Chancellor Boulevard, one of the three possible exit routes from the campus.
By 2:30 p.m., 150 to 200 protesters were seated on Chancellor Boulevard at the Theology Mall/Newton Crescent intersection, effectively blocking that exit route. The many RCMP officers present tried unsuccessfully to persuade the protesters to move off the roadway so motorcades could pass.
The protesters then decided they would try to block all three exits. One of them, Mark Brooks, used a megaphone to announce that he would head down Marine Drive and he invited anyone interested to join him. Some stayed where they were but about 40 to 50 people joined him. The destination was Gate 6 although Mr. Brooks did not know it by that designation. Others went to the intersection of Marine Drive and Newton Wynd to block the remaining exit.
Command Centre had been advised at about 2:45 p.m. that the protesters had devised a plan to attempt to block all three exits. By 3:00 p.m. Insp. Mullen, who was in charge of motorcades, circulated word that all three exits were compromised.
At that point, Command Centre was aware of the situation, as were the many officers out in the field, including Supts. May and Thompsett and Insps. Dingwall and Edwards who were near the Chancellor Boulevard exit. S/Sgt. Stewart was present as well and Insp. Doern of the VPD Crowd Control Unit and Insp. St. Martin of the National Capital Region Tactical Team also arrived to assess the situation.
12.4.3. Gate 6
Mr. Brooks and his group arrived at Gate 6 very soon after 3:00 p.m. Four RCMP officers were there, including Cst. Marie Potvin. She had been assigned to the zone that included that area at 7:00 a.m. together with three other officers and Zone Commander Cpl. Flamank. During the day these officers performed traffic duties. Wooden barricades had been set across the road to prevent the traffic on Marine Drive from gaining entry to the campus beyond that point. The barricades were moved from time to time to allow access to accredited vehicles. Other vehicles were rerouted to the right, up University Boulevard.
Cst. Potvin testified that Mr. Brooks approached her:
... and he told me that he did not have any problems with the police and he didn't want to fight with the police, that they were just going to protest against the other people. And that they wanted to sit in the middle of the street where we were.
Mr. Brooks spoke over the megaphone to his associates, telling them that, if the RCMP asked them to move they should do so unless they had thought about it long and hard and were prepared to be arrested. He expected that the protesters would be given the opportunity to get up and leave if asked to do so and he asked the RCMP to give them fair warning to clear the road if that was the police intention. This happened before S/Sgt. Stewart arrived, with two of his Quick Response Teams, at about 3:45 p.m.
Cpl. John Gulayets and his Quick Response Team of eight to 10 officers were already present when S/Sgt. Stewart arrived. Cpl. Gulayets had gone to Gate 6 on his own initiative when he realized that protesters had been moving in that direction. He and his team took up positions on the road behind the barricades and were joined by the four or five other officers present. Cpl. Flamank was there. Cpl. Gulayets realized that the number of protesters was growing and, like Cst. Potvin, he found them to be passive and cooperative. On one occasion, the protesters readily moved from the roadway to allow for an ambulance to pass. Cpl. Gulayets observed:
Actually most of them were pretty passive. They were sitting – about half were sitting on the ground, the other half were standing. There was one with a bull horn. Some of the protestors were chanting chants, I guess, whatever, you know, whatever they do. And basically it was actually quite peaceful at that point.
It was this group of protesters that S/Sgt. Stewart was ultimately instructed to move from the road in order to make way for the departing motorcades of the 18 APEC leaders.
12.4.4. Police Planning
Were the RCMP planners aware of the prospect of a blockade of all three exit routes and the seriousness of such an event, from the perspective of the safety of the 18 leaders? Leaving aside for the moment the information that the RCMP had on that subject, the application of common sense by reasonable people surely would have alerted them to the possibility and potential gravity of such an occurrence.Insp. Dingwall spoke of the seriousness of the blockade of all three exit routes:I can tell you that I was very concerned about, at one point, all three exits were blocked at UBC. To me that's a –– that's a huge security risk, and the, I mean, there's –– there's many, many possibilities here, and one is simply, should a leader have to depart that location, for whatever reason, whether it's to deal with the Iraqi tension as it was going on, whether it was to deal with a –– a serious situation in their home country, or whether they had a medical problem and –– and many had –– had doctors with them. But if –– if they needed treatment, they needed whatever, we were blocked in. And –– and frankly that was unacceptable to me at any time. Let alone the onset of night, again having 18 leaders sequestered in one location for that length of period, it was simply unacceptable and –– and it had to be resolved.Supt. Green was assigned two major responsibilities for the APEC conference:
- He was a member of the Security Steering Committee chaired by Supt. May, which position placed him within the inner circle of RCMP planners; and
- He was one of the overall Commanders within the Command Centre during the APEC Conference, and was on duty in the Command Centre on the afternoon of November 25.
When asked about his awareness of the possibility of protesters blocking the exits, Supt. Green indicated that he and, presumably, his colleagues on the Security Steering Committee, were attuned to the obvious:
Well knowing that there ... was limited access out of there, you know those contingencies were always part of the planning process.
Before assessing what was done to prepare for such an eventuality, I turn to specific information that was known to the planners. RCMP members had attended an APEC Alert meeting where the group discussed the feasibility of establishing roadblocks either prior to the diplomats' arrival or to prevent their exit from campus. They discussed the fact that there were three possible routes in and out of the campus and they therefore would require a number of bodies to successfully block all of the routes simultaneously. This intelligence was made known to the planners, as was the following paragraph, contained in the November 19 daily Threat Assessment Group bulletin:
E-mail from Jonathon OPPENHEIMER (identified in TAG Threat Assessment p. 57) to APEC Alert members, copy attached. This e-mail reflects a proposed shift in protest strategy by APEC Alert for UBC on November 25th. To this point all protests were scheduled to take place on UBC grounds as close to the Museum of Anthropology as the protesters could get. The new strategy suggests placing protesters/pickets on the three main routes into the university.
Mr. Oppenheim's e-mail, dated November 18, was in the possession of the Threat Assessment Group either on that day or early the next morning and read in part as follows:
if you look at a map of the security zone there are 3 possible routes they can take in or out, Northwest Marine, Chancellor and Southwest Marine. I think Northwest Marine is the most likely route, but who knows. So if people want to greet the limos, they should let someone at the tent city know which road they will try to picket and that way, we can ensure that all 3 roads are covered.
Supt. May agreed that he was not surprised to learn that the students had blocked Gate 3 because he had known for several days about discussions among anti-APEC groups encouraging people to block the exits available for motorcade departures.
What plans were put in place to deal with the possible blockade of the three exit routes available to the APEC leaders leaving the museum? The answer is that there was no recorded plan to address what Insp. Dingwall described as a "huge security risk." The evidence shows:
- The draft operational plan for protests and demonstrations prepared on Supt. Thompsett's instructions by Insp. Edwards did not specifically address the potential blockade. He and Insp. Killaly, who saw the plan, lacked both the time and the background needed for thoughtful consideration of the problem. In any event, I doubt that it was the responsibility of the Site Commander to plan for possible blockades. As Deputy Site Commander, Insp. Edwards said the protection of the exit routes was "not our problem to deal with:" There was a specific Alpha '97 or overall APEC function of route security and that was their issue and the motorcades themselves, obviously to deal with.
... As I say, the route security was specifically in place to deal with those routes and of course the motorcades also have their own structure of RCMP officers there and so on.
- Insp. Robert Moulton who, as duty officer, played a key role in Command Centre on the afternoon of November 25, was not aware of any specific advance plans for clearing demonstrators from the roads.
- Supt. Casey, who shared overall command in the Command Centre at this critical time with Deputy Chief McGuinness of the VPD, knew of no such plan. Like Supt. Green, Supt. Casey was a member of the overall Security Steering Committee chaired by Supt. May. His special area of responsibility was Intelligence Investigation. He had considerable knowledge with respect to the overall security issue. His role in the Command Centre was a second responsibility he carried on the day of the leaders' meeting. He said the RCMP did not have an advance plan to address the possibility of protesters blocking the road on the way out. He said it would have been Supt. Thompsett's responsibility to go down there and deal with any such situation.
- Supt. May indicated that if all three exits were blocked, resources would be available to deal with the situation, including route security, mobile responses, the Quick Response Teams, the Tactical Troops and other site security personnel assigned to that location. But as to whether there was a specific plan in place to deal with potential blockades, Supt. May, who was head of security planning, testified that he was aware of no such plan.
- S/Sgt. Stewart thought that Insp. Edwards' draft operational plan for protests and demonstrations may have addressed this issue but he saw neither it nor any other plan specifically addressing road blockades. He acknowledged that, if no contingency plan existed to deal with the possibility that the students might congregate on the exit routes, that would be a gap in RCMP planning.
According to expert evidence called at the hearing, a plan addressing potential blockades should have been in place. Insp. Ryan of the Toronto Police Service held responsibility for both crowds and disaster events in Toronto, and has had an extensive career in crowd control and demonstrations at large public events in Toronto. He said that, when plans are made for major events involving visiting world leaders, the police expect that demonstrators will make an effort at some point to block exit from the functions. Planning documents should address such eventualities. Specifically, he agreed that plans should have been made for the possibility of the blockade at Gate 6. C/Supt. Milton holds responsibility for the personal protection of VIPs and International Protected Persons visiting the UK. He viewed the routes in and out of the UBC campus and told the hearing:
The exit routes should never have been –– never be blocked in any location like this. It's of paramount importance that if you are running a protection operation that you always have a method of getting out of that location.
C/Insp. Caldwell has had extensive experience in practice and as a trainer in public order policy matters. He is the London police force's chief tactical advisor on public order events and is responsible for strategic training for all senior officers in public order and major incident management. He testified that in planning for such an event a major focus would be on securing entrances and exits early on and ensuring that they remain secure at all costs:
Gain the –– gain the ground right from the outset and hold that ground throughout the whole –– whole time of the event by producing a policing plan which was robust enough to ensure that those gates were never lost.
With specific reference to the entrances and exits at UBC, Chief Insp. Caldwell said that pre-event planning should provide for sufficient resources to keep the gates open. A plan that would have enabled the RCMP to maintain the access routes open for the duration of the event – rendering the removal of blockades unnecessary – should have been in place. In fact, no tactical plan existed to enable the RCMP to maintain the exits in a secure and open state throughout the daylight hours of November 25.
12.4.5. Confusion at the Gates
I now turn to a consideration of what occurred between 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. A study of all of the evidence by officers in the Command Centre and by those out in the field can only lead to the conclusion that the blockade of the three exits created considerable confusion. This confusion put the officers responsible for ensuring the safety of the leaders in a state of great anxiety as they wrestled with the challenge facing them.
In reference to the blockade and the demonstrations near the flagpole earlier in the day, Deputy Chief McGuinness testified about the joint command operation making the best out of the "chaos" that was occurring. He testified about mix-ups that occurred in the course of communicating messages from Command Centre to those in the field and said that, with all that was going on, many of the communications coming into and going out of the Command Centre would have been "missed."
Insp. William Ard, who had taken responsibility for organizing and establishing the Command Centre, had volunteered to assist in the Command Centre that afternoon.
When the roads became blocked and personnel had to be located to open a gate, he said that the urgency of the situation took over and protocol was not followed. He agreed that, given the shortness of time before the motorcades were to depart, there was a scramble for resources within the "breakout room" of the Command Centre.
Deputy Chief McGuinness explained one of a number of communications gaps that occurred during this hour:
Well, ... we're talking minutes here, and seconds. And the point is, is that in the best laid plans, when you're –– when you're following a plan, it's ideal if everything can fall into place one after another. But when you're met with different circumstances that are coming up very quickly, sometimes the best laid plans oft go astray, and this is the case here.
While I cannot disagree with the wisdom of those comments, the fact of the matter is that there simply was no plan in place to address a blockade of the exits. There was no plan to go astray. This, more than anything else, is the explanation for the events that unfolded between 3:00 and 4:00 that afternoon.
Discussions about what should be done were taking place between the officers out in the field near the Chancellor Boulevard exit (Gate 3). Similar discussions were taking place at Command Centre where Deputy Chief McGuinness and Supt. Casey were in command. Officers within Command Centre briefly considered using helicopters to remove the dignitaries from the site but dismissed the idea as being too dangerous.
S/Sgt. Stewart was called to the May/Dingwall/Thompsett discussions in the field a number of times to answer questions and give advice. Soon after 3:00 p.m., S/Sgt. Stewart directed Sgt. McLaren to call two reserve Quick Response Teams from the Seaforth Armouries to come to UBC.
Supt. Thompsett, recognizing his responsibilities as Site Commander, telephoned Insp. Killaly who had arrived at Gate 6 and had taken charge at that location under his instructions. Insp. Killaly told Supt. Thompsett that there were 25 to 30 passive protesters at the gate. Supt. Thompsett asked him whether, if two or three Quick Response Teams were sent down with a couple of dog teams, the intersection could be cleared. Supt. Thompsett said Insp. Killaly's response was: "consider it done." Insp. Killaly's evidence of what occurred is consistent with that of Supt. Thompsett. I accept Supt. Thompsett's evidence that, immediately following his conversation with Insp. Killaly, he was about to secure those resources and set the clearance process in motion. It was then approximately 3:10 p.m.
12.4.6. A Change in Command
While Supt. Thompsett had been on the telephone to Insp. Killaly, Supts. May and Dingwall were in touch with Command Centre. They had learned that, shortly after 3:00 p.m., a decision had been made at Command Centre to take over command from Supt. Thompsett. Decisions as to how the leaders' exit would be secured would be made at Command Centre, presumably by Deputy Chief McGuinness and Supt. Casey who, at that time, shared responsibility at the top. A major factor in arriving at this decision was the Command Centre's ability to monitor the events on campus through a Westcam feed coming from an aerial camera. Insp. Moulton explained that other reasons included the availability of information coming from intelligence and Command Centre's control over available resources and ability to re-deploy those resources where required. Supt. Thompsett said it was either Supt. May or Insp. Dingwall who advised him of Command Centre's decision to take charge and that he abided by that decision.
12.4.7. Clearing Gate 6
The decision to clear Gate 6 was made at about 3:15 p.m. Both Deputy Chief McGuinness and Supt. Casey were part of that decision-making process. At that point, Command Centre was not aware of the impending availability of the Quick Response Teams from the Seaforth Armouries. Insp. Moulton said that it was the understanding in Command Centre that the Quick Response Teams were virtually all deployed at the site of the security breach that had occurred earlier at the flagpole and that it would be necessary to use other resources to open Gate 6. Insp. Moulton said that Command Centre did not see the two Crowd Control Units, one from Vancouver and the other from Ottawa, as available options at that time. They were to be used as a last resort.
Sometime between 3:20 and 3:25, Deputy Chief McGuinness and Supt. Casey decided how the exit would be cleared. Two buses were to be sent immediately to gather up and bring officers to Gate 6 to open it. One bus would bring personnel who had recently gone off shift and were then at the Heather St. Barracks. The other bus would gather up personnel along the planned motorcade route out of Chancellor Boulevard and into downtown Vancouver. Because of the re-routing through Gate 6, their services would no longer be required on the streets of Vancouver. Clearly, the hope was that these buses would arrive at Gate 6 as soon as possible. It was anticipated that about 100 officers would be available and, on their arrival, they would encourage the protesters to voluntarily open the route. If that failed, the officers would physically remove any remaining protesters by carrying them off the road.
12.4.8. Misdirection to the Crowd Control Unit
Meanwhile, it was decided at Command Centre that, to be in a position to clear the crowds at the two other locations if that should become necessary, the VPD Crowd Control Unit would be dispatched to Gate 3 in "level one" dress. It was thought that the arrival of the unit would be seen as an indication that an exit out of Chancellor Boulevard remained a likely option. They would also be available to help clear the Marine Drive/Newton Wynd exit if the need arose.
Somehow, the instructions that Deputy Chief McGuinness said were to be relayed by one of the duty officers were incorrectly transmitted to Insp. Doern. He was never in fact instructed to go to Gate 3, but he was instructed to deploy in "level two" attire. It was not possible to ascertain where communications broke down. It was Insp. Edwards who gave the instructions to Insp. Doern, but Insp. Edwards did not recall the details of what he was requested to pass on. In any event, Insp. Doern said that he received clear instructions to deploy his unit in "level two" dress – hard hats, batons, etc., and I am satisfied that that is the information he was given.
At 3:20 p.m., the VPD Crowd Control Unit, in "level two" dress, was outside the Rose Garden alongside the National Capital Region Tactical Team, similarly dressed. At 3:40 p.m., Cpl. Randy Wong at Command Centre spoke to Insp. Doern by telephone and instructed him to take his unit double time to Gate 4 (across Marine Drive from the museum at the intersection of West Mall). Insp. Doern wondered about those instructions as there had been no indication of difficulties at Gate 4. No instructions were ever given to Insp. Doern to either deploy his unit in "level one" attire or to go to Gate 3 although that is where he had expected to be assigned and it was there that Command Centre intended Insp. Doern and the VPD Crowd Control Unit to be assigned, in "level one" attire.
Gate 4 was close to where the unit was located when Insp. Doern received his latest instructions. On his arrival there, nobody was in sight but Supt. May soon arrived and said that the blockade to be cleared was at Gate 6 and that the 70 Crowd Control personnel were to proceed there immediately – a distance of about one mile. With 54 pounds of equipment attached to each member, the Crowd Control Unit quickly ran the mile to Gate 6. However, just before they got there, Supt. Thompsett, on instructions he had just received from Supt. Casey, arrived by vehicle alongside Insp. Doern. He told Insp. Doern that Gate 6 had now been cleared and that his unit should get out of sight as the motorcades were about to go through.
The unit moved off to an adjoining parking lot and instructions were soon received to change to "level one" dress and be ready for deployment elsewhere in Vancouver. No explanation for all of this confusion was provided at the hearing.
12.4.9. Departure Time Nears
Meanwhile, other developments unknown to either Deputy Chief McGuinness or Supt. Casey were taking place. The scheduled departure time for the motorcades was 3:55 p.m. While that was the time printed in a schedule distributed to senior personnel, there were suggestions that 4:00 p.m. was a more likely time. Supt. May thought that the latter time was reliable. In any event, it was generally understood that departures were to commence between 3:55 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. There were no assurances as to when the busloads of personnel would arrive. Deputy Chief McGuinness acknowledged that, if they did not arrive prior to the posted departure time, the contingency would be to stack the motorcades at the museum until the exit route had been opened. That is where things stood at 3:40 p.m.
At or about that time, Insp. Dingwall, who was still at the Chancellor Boulevard (Gate 3) location, telephoned to Command Centre. Insp. Ard received the call. The Quick Response Teams had arrived near Gate 3 from Seaforth Armouries and Insp. Dingwall reported that S/Sgt. Stewart had 30 officers in three vans, who could proceed to Gate 6 to clear the road if that is what Command Centre wanted. Insp. Ard recalled that this news was "like a gift from heaven." He shouted to the rest of the group at the Command Centre: "Is it confirmed we're going to use Gate 6?" Someone confirmed that this was the plan so he told Insp. Dingwall to send S/Sgt. Stewart to clear Gate 6. Insp. Moulton relayed the message, through S/Sgt. Brian Papp at the Quick Response Team desk at Command Centre, as well as to the motorcades and route people, that S/Sgt. Stewart and the Quick Response Teams were to be used to clear Gate 6.
It was not made clear just who Insp. Ard was in communication with immediately prior to passing the instructions to Insp. Dingwall. Overall Commanders McGuinness and Casey were not involved because the first indication they had that S/Sgt. Stewart was available to assist was when they saw him arrive with his officers at Gate 6, on the Westcam video. That says a great deal about the air of uncertainty prevailing at that very crucial time. Neither Deputy Chief McGuinness nor Supt. Casey were critical of Insp. Ard's direction to Insp. Dingwall to dispatch S/Sgt. Stewart to clear Gate 6. Deputy Chief McGuinness called this a good deployment of available resources. He said that as he saw the Quick Response Teams arrive, he expected that the demonstrators would be physically removed from the road. Supt. Casey said that the means by which that would be done would be a matter for decision by those present on the ground.
Insp. Moulton said it was about 3:45 p.m. when he spoke to Officer Papp and told him to tell S/Sgt. Stewart that he had five to six minutes to clear the intersection. Insp. Moulton believed that the road should be cleared 10 minutes before the actual motorcade departure.
It was from Insp. Dingwall, however, that S/Sgt. Stewart took his instructions and those instructions had come at about 3:41 p.m., as a result of the conversation moments earlier between Insps. Ard and Dingwall. Insp. Dingwall said that he told S/Sgt. Stewart that there was not a lot of time to act as the motorcades were scheduled to leave between 3:55 and 4:00 p.m. He told S/Sgt. Stewart to pull away in the vans slowly so that people would not notice him leaving Gate 3.
S/Sgt. Stewart was clear and definite about the instructions he had received from Insp. Dingwall. I believe him and I accept the truth of what he said about the detail of those instructions. I am also of the view that Insp. Dingwall communicated to S/Sgt. Stewart what he believed his instructions to be from Insp. Ard.
S/Sgt. Stewart had been under the assumption that 4 p.m. was the time by which Gate 6 needed to be cleared but just before he left Gate 3, Insp. Dingwall told him the job needed to be done by 3:50. By his watch, he had six minutes left, and he was still two minutes away from Gate 6.
He spoke to his officers and told them to follow to Gate 6 in cavalcade. There were two vans and two dog vehicles. They drove, at the speed limit or slightly below, to an area east of the blockade at the Gate, parked on the south side of the road, facing oncoming traffic, and got out of the vehicles.
On his arrival, S/Sgt. Stewart understood that he had something less than five minutes to clear the road in order to comply with his instructions. He had a very short discussion with the officers, reminding them what they were going to do: that they were going to line up and march forward. He moved the barricade to get by it, directed other officers to move the barricades off the roadway and gave his order to the protesters.
Sgt. McLaren said that, as he drove with S/Sgt. Stewart to Gate 6, S/Sgt. Stewart told him that they had four minutes to clear the Gate. Sgt. McLaren understood S/Sgt. Stewart to mean that the road absolutely, positively had to be cleared in that time period. I believe Sgt. McLaren when he says that that is what S/Sgt. Stewart told him and I believe that that is what S/Sgt. Stewart understood his instructions to be.
What occurred at Gate 6 following S/Sgt. Stewart's arrival will be considered in Chapter 28.
12.5.1. UBC Detachment
Policing services for UBC campus are provided out of the RCMP's UBC Detachment. Yet until September 15, 1997, when S/Sgt. Lloyd Plante arrived as NCO in charge of the detachment, the detachment had not had any involvement in the extensive planning that had been going on for the APEC leaders' meeting that would take place on campus on November 25.
Upon assuming command, S/Sgt. Plante discovered that the detachment had no direct representation in the planning process and he was concerned that the detachment lacked an understanding of what planning had taken place. He learned that there had been discussions between senior planners and UBC but that the detachment had not been involved. He said that, had he been at the detachment when planning began for the leaders' meeting, he would have had direct representation in the planning process and that there would have been a benefit in having a member from the detachment involved in the Site Command.
As November 25 was just two months away when S/Sgt. Plante arrived at the detachment, he set about making some changes. He contacted Site Commander Thompsett and assigned Cpl. Tracy Duffield to represent the detachment in planning processes that could affect the detachment's resources and the way it would deal with situations that arose. From that point onward, the detachment was represented at meetings of the Intelligence and Investigation Group. Cpl. Duffield met with the events coordinator at UBC, with the Site Commander and his assistant and others involved in the APEC events.
Cpl. Tracy Duffield, with the assistance of S/Sgt. Plante, drew up an APEC Operational Plan. It provided that the detachment would be responsible for pre-APEC security and demonstrations up to Friday November 21, 1997. Until the "red zone" was secured, members from UBC detachment would be first responders to any incidents. Once the "red zone" was in place, demonstrations would be handled by members assigned to the APEC security force. Members from UBC detachment were not to enter the "red zone" unless called upon.
The "red zone" was the secure zone behind the security fence. S/Sgt. Plante explained that, up to the date of the installation of the fence, the UBC detachment was responsible for providing general policing services to the entire UBC community, even though many activities requiring RCMP involvement were specifically focused towards APEC. Once the secure area was established by the erection of the fence, the area within it became the responsibility of the Site Commander, with the detachment retaining responsibility for incidents outside the secure zone. On November 25 itself, any activities in the vicinity of the site that were related to APEC events would be the responsibility of the Site Commander. For example, even though the noon rally was outside the secure zone, since it was specifically directed at the APEC leaders' meeting, it was entirely the responsibility of the Site Commander. S/Sgt. Plante kept Supt. Thompsett advised of occurrences that he thought should come to his attention. For example, S/Sgt. Plante told Supt. Thompsett about the November 7 incident that ultimately led to the November 24 arrest of protestor Jaggi Singh. He also told Supt. Thompsett that a Report to Crown Counsel on that incident had been submitted and, subsequently, that charges had been approved by the Crown and that a warrant was issued or would soon issue for Mr. Singh's arrest.
Supt. Thompsett made it clear that S/Sgt. Plante was in touch with him in such instances to keep him up to speed, and not to obtain his input. Such decisions were seen by both of them as being the responsibility of S/Sgt. Plante.
All of S/Sgt. Plante's and Cpl. Duffield's communications were with Supt. Thompsett or his assistant. Supt. May and Insp. Dingwall were not on S/Sgt. Plante's list for notification and Supt. Thompsett said that he did not discuss the information about Mr. Singh's arrest with either of them.
With reference to the Singh matter, S/Sgt. Plante made a number of significant decisions. It was his decision to recommend to Crown Counsel that an assault charge be laid against Mr. Singh, that a warrant for his arrest issue, and that his release from custody be on the condition that he not attend at UBC. He also instructed officers as to how and where Mr. Singh should be arrested.
Because these decisions seemed so relevant to what had been occurring on campus in the days and weeks leading up to November 25, a question arises as to what linkage there may have been between the detachment and all of the planning and intelligence gathering that had gone into the APEC event, particularly as relates to Mr. Singh who was either the leader of, or one of the few leaders of, the anti-APEC demonstrators. As the following would indicate, that linkage – if it existed – was weak indeed.
S/Sgt. Plante said that the Singh investigation involving the November 7 incident was basically left to him. Asked about his decision to seek the arrest of Mr. Singh, he said he did not know exactly what reaction to expect from Mr. Singh's arrest. He said:
I wanted to try and eliminate as much of the risk of a confrontation as I could. I weighed the fact, frankly, that any arrest of Mr. Singh could promote some sort of confrontation. I recognized that, and it was an issue that, frankly, weighed very heavily and in the process that we had to follow. It was a very real concern of mine.
I pressed in the following way for further clarification:
The Commissioner: In making that kind of a decision, I gather you were on your own, and what interests me is, what contact did you have with all of the security planning that went into APEC with May being on staff for 18 months or something, and Dingwall and Thompsett, who were in the middle of this for a long, long period of time. What--where did you fit into all of that and what was going on with respect to Singh and the arrest and so on, as part of the overall security planning for APEC, if there was any contact?
The Witness: There was--frankly, the Singh investigation was basically left to myself. What I –-what I tried to rely on was information that we received from the Threat Assessment people. I spoke to, you know, officers that had direct contact with APEC Alert, and with--you know, had infiltrated the group, and I was trying to reach that balance myself based on information that I was able to find out,
The Commissioner: Was the Singh investigation left to you by design, by order? How did that occur? Or just because you were head of that detachment?
The Witness: Basically, because I was--I shouldn't say basically. Because I was head of the detachment.
The Commissioner: Well, was there any--any decision made that that's where that should be dealt with, rather than in the overall APEC security package?
The Witness: No, part of the planning process that I've previously discussed. It was clear to me that my responsibilities relating to criminal acts or civil disobedience that occurred prior to the fence being constructed was clearly the responsibility of University Detachment, myself. So I-I fully accepted the responsibility for that particular issue.
Details of what occurred at the time of the alleged assault on November 7 and of Mr. Singh's arrest and release will be considered in Chapter 17.
That the right hand did not know what the left hand was doing was certainly apparent when the Tibetan flag was removed from the flagpole on the roof of the Graduate Student Society Building, inside the secure zone, as will be discussed in Chapter 20. The initiative to remove the flag was taken by S/Sgt. Plante, who by his own admission was without authority in the secure zone at that time. He was also quite unaware that Site Commander Thompsett had made a deal that would allow the flag to remain in place throughout the day. Once again, the weakness of the linkage between elements of the policing structure leading up to and including November 25 was quite apparent.
The consequences of failing to include the UBC Detachment in the policing aspect of the APEC planning structure in a meaningful way right from the start, rather than leaving it to the new officer in charge to take the initiative to become involved just two months before the event, was in my opinion a significant factor leading to the complaints that arose under categories 5 and 9.
12.5.2. Richmond Detachment
When morning broke on November 25, Richmond Detachment personnel had no knowledge or expectation of what the day might hold for their facility. By afternoon they would be swamped by the unplanned arrival of 40 prisoners from UBC campus.
In fact, two planning documents prepared in the lead-up to the APEC conference had referred to the need to plan for handling prisoners at the Richmond Detachment. Neither plan was ever forwarded to the detachment.
The Acting Officer in Command at the Richmond Detachment, Insp. Allan Speevak, testified that they had never been notified to expect any prisoners from APEC. Asked when it was that he first learned that prisoners would be arriving, he said the first formal notice he had was about 1:54 p.m. when Insp. Ard called to say they should expect 12 prisoners from UBC. In fact, the prisoners had already started to arrive at the cell block located on a level below Insp. Speevak's office.
This lapse in communication was in spite of the fact that a Prisoner Handling Operational Plan had been prepared more than a month earlier.
As head of prisoner handling for the APEC conference, Cpl. James Harrison was assigned to complete such a plan. It was completed on October 23. Attached to the Prisoner Handling Operational Plan was an Appendix titled "Cell Accommodations/Capacities/ Procedures". Cell block locations identified included the Richmond Detachment which was listed as having a capacity of 40 total: 16 bunks, 4 adult cells, 2 youth cells, 2 adult female cells, and "drunk tank." Cpl. Harrison had obtained that information from the Richmond Detachment for inclusion in his Operational Plan. As he was required to do, he submitted the plan to the Security Steering Committee for APEC. He said the plan was approved by the Committee. He did not forward it to the Richmond Detachment nor did he alert the detachment to the possible need for its cells on November 25. He said he expected that, upon approval, APEC Command would circulate the Prisoner Handling Operational Plan. The plan was never circulated, nor was it mentioned to the Richmond Detachment.
The November 22 operational plan drafted by Insp. Edwards for protests and demonstrations referred to the fact that, beyond the cell accommodation for approximately 10 prisoners at the UBC Detachment, "further prisoner processing and detention will be at the RCMP Richmond Detachment." That plan never got beyond the draft stage and was not circulated.
As it turned out, it was a very busy day at the Richmond Detachment, as a result of prisoners transferred from UBC. Deputy Sheriff Kendall Howard, who had worked in the Richmond building for eight years, said he had never before seen numbers like it in the cell block. He said he saw the staff being potentially overwhelmed by the numbers coming in and he offered his assistance.
Cpl. Harrison, in his final report on November 27 as the Prisoner Handling Coordinator of the APEC Operational Support Group, described what went on at Richmond as a "nightmare." What occurred at the Richmond Detachment during the afternoon and evening of November 25 as a result of the transfer of 40 prisoners from UBC will be reviewed in Chapter 29.