APEC – Commission Interim Report
On November 22 and 23, six protesters were arrested after refusing to leave their tents near the Museum of Anthropology. The area had become part of the security zone. Besides the arrests themselves, issue is taken with the undertakings that the arrested protesters were obliged to sign before they could be released. Those undertakings placed restrictions on the protesters' activities for the duration of the APEC conference.
15.1. The RCMP Plan
In the spring of 1997, Cpl. James Harrison of the RCMP was assigned the role of Head of Prisoner Handling for the APEC conference. His regular duties at the time were as a Watch Commander at the Mission Detachment. He testified that his instructions came "directly from Insp. Forsythe who was the Officer in Charge of the Ops Support Group, the planning group which I was attached to." Asked what instructions he had received with respect to the Prison Handling Operational Plan, he said:
My frame of reference was, please develop a plan for handling of prisoners that are taken at APEC, period. There were no other frames of reference, points of reference, or suggestions made to me as to how it should be done. It was prepare an Ops Plan, and submit it to us, and we'll review it and once--once a plan is--is developed and approved, that will be what you will put into operation.
Cpl. Harrison said he made every effort to find plans and documentation prepared for events that had been held in the past at UBC, such as the Yeltsin-Clinton summit. His search extended to the federal archives in Burnaby, but nowhere could he find any records to assist in his preparations. He said his search was not only for "undertaking" forms to be signed by accused persons before their release, but for a broad range of documentation:
It was the whole issue of prisoner handling, everything from contacts, arranging transport, arranging cells, all of that. And none of that information is available, and--which meant that I had to start from square one to rebuild the entire Operational Plan. The undertaking to appear was simply just one part of that overall situation.
With limited background and no research assistance, Cpl. Harrison moved forward with his assigned task and prepared the Operational Plan, a three page document covering duties and responsibilities; reporting procedures; shifts and hours of work; communications; equipment; and travel and accommodations. It also contained five appendices:
- Interjurisdictional Protocols For Prisoner Handling
- Cell Accommodations/Capacities & Procedures
- Prisoner Transport/Responsibilities & Equipment
- Conditions for Undertakings Before Justice Of The Peace
- VPD Mass Arrest Procedures (Riots or Unlawful Gatherings)
A relevant clause in the Plan, under the heading "Duties and Responsibilities" reads:
The unit is responsible for ensuring that any prisoner released prior to Court be released before a Justice of the Peace with appropriate conditions to limit their access to any of the Conference venues or dignitaries.
15.2. The Conditions: Original Undertaking Form
Appendix 4 to the Operational Plan reads:
PRISONER HANDLING
CONDITIONS FOR UNDERTAKINGS BEFORE A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
- I WILL NOT ATTEND WITHIN 100 METRES OF ANY VENUE OR SITE WHERE OFFICIALS OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS PARTICIPATING IN THE ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION MAY BE IN ATTENDANCE BETWEEN THE DATES, NOVEMBER 18TH, 1997 AND NOVEMBER 26TH, 1997, NAMELY: THE VANCOUVER TRADE AND CONVENTION CENTRE THE UNIVERSITY OF B.C. MUSEUM OF ANTHROPOLOGY MACKENZIE HOUSE UBC, 6565 NW MARINE DRIVE, VANCOUVER THE VANCOUVER INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT B.C. PLACE STADIUM THE PAN PACIFIC HOTEL, VANCOUVER THE FOUR SEASONS HOTEL, VANCOUVER THE HOTEL VANCOUVER THE HYATT REGENCY HOTEL, VANCOUVER THE METROPOLITAN HOTEL, VANCOUVER THE RENAISSANCE VANCOUVER HOTEL THE SHERATON WALL CENTRE, VANCOUVER THE SUTTON PLACE HOTEL, VANCOUVER THE WEDGEWOOD HOTEL, VANCOUVER
- I WILL, UPON BEING NOTIFIED BY ANY PEACE OFFICER THAT I AM WITHIN 100 METRES OF AN INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED PERSON OR OFFICIAL DELEGATE TO THE ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION IMMEDIATELY DEPART FROM THAT LOCATION FOLLOWING THE DIRECTION OF SUCH PEACE OFFICER.
- I WILL NOT PARTICIPATE OR BE FOUND IN ATTENDANCE AT ANY PUBLIC DEMONSTRATION OR RALLY THAT HAS GATHERED TOGETHER FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF DEMONSTRATING AGAINST THE ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION OR ANY NATION PARTICIPATING IN THE SO NAMED CONFERENCE.
Cpl. Harrison completed the Operational Plan, and, pursuant to his instructions, sent it to the Security Steering Committee for APEC for approval. At the time he was notified of its approval, a fourth condition was recommended to him for insertion into the undertaking. Cpl. Harrison was "uncomfortable" with the fourth condition and, as a result, it was not incorporated into the undertaking that the accused persons were required to sign. I see no need to make further reference to the proposed fourth condition.
Cpl. Harrison said he did not ask Crown Counsel to approve the three conditions that were contained in the undertaking document, and did not seek other legal advice about them, because they were intended as recommendations to a Justice of the Peace, to be taken into consideration along with all other factors relating to any alleged offence. I am satisfied that Cpl. Harrison believed that the Justice of the Peace would determine the appropriate conditions and consider the requirements of the Charter.
15.3. The Revised Undertaking Form
Before they were released, the six accused were required to sign the undertaking document, containing the three conditions, at the UBC Detachment. The first four accused were those arrested immediately after the museum became part of the secure zone in the early evening of November 22. The other two had made their way into that zone late in the evening of November 23 and were arrested when they refused to leave.
There was one difference between the form of undertaking signed by all six accused and the draft attached as Appendix 4 to the Operational Plan: the signed undertakings were entitled "Conditions for Undertakings Before an Officer in Charge" rather than "Conditions for Undertakings Before a Justice of the Peace."
Cpl. Harrison testified that after the Operational Plan was approved he amended the title of the form at the request of the VPD. The VPD wanted an undertaking in that form because its practice was to have releases from custody occur before an Officer in Charge, not a Justice of the Peace as required by the RCMP's Operational Plan. The fact is, however, that it was the "Officer in Charge" form redrafted for the VPD that came to be used at the RCMP's UBC Detachment for the release of the six prisoners.
15.4. Departure from the Plan
Cpl. Harrison was asked about this departure from the Operational Plan that he had developed:
There was a great deal of confusion as to whose responsibility, the handling of these prisoners and--and this action was because of the fact that the site had not been fully secured and the manpower and resources allocated to--to the UBC venue were not on site at the time. Therefore, what ended up, in reality, happening, is that everything reverted to UBC Detachment and as a result of that, the prisoners and the whole process ended up coming under the--the command of Staff Sergeant Lloyd Plante. And at that point, the prisoners were--were in cells, booked in cells at UBC Detachment. Staff Sergeant Lloyd Plante and I had a discussion and he expressed to me that he felt, given the circumstances and conditions, that the best thing that we should do is ensure that the prisoners are released as soon as possible. We both agreed on this point, and felt that it was imperative that they be released as soon as possible, and therefore we departed from the plan and--and the release before Officer in Charge option was--was exercised.
S/Sgt. Plante confirmed that the releases occurred before an Officer in Charge in order to avoid detaining the prisoners:
Q: All right. Why did you, first of all, decide that they should be released by an Officer in Charge, as opposed to going before a Justice of the Peace?
A: Well the alternative was to detain these individuals in custody in my cell block until the next day, when a Justice of the Peace would be available, and I wanted to avoid that. I didn't feel that there would be a need to detain these people.
In agreeing to the use of the amended form of undertaking, Cpl. Harrison said the implications of bypassing an appearance before a Justice of the Peace never crossed his mind. He said it seemed reasonable to proceed as agreed by the two officers. S/Sgt. Plante said he believed that Crown Counsel had reviewed the conditions and that he had no flexibility in determining release conditions that were part of the Operational Plan.
15.5. The Complainants
None of the six accused persons filed complaints about the arrests, or about the undertakings they were required to sign. In their closing written submission, however, Complainants' counsel referred to "general complaints regarding the legality of the undertakings and the conditions they imposed." They identified two such complaints:
- Mr. Gerald Wood said in his written complaint to the Commission: "I am no lawyer but I question the legality of the statement those arrested were asked to sign."
- The B.C. Civil Liberties Association asked the Commission to inquire into, amongst many other areas, "the requirement of persons who [were] arrested to agree to certain conditions in order to be released from custody."
Complainants' counsel did not take issue with the first condition, but submitted that the second and third conditions were neither authorized by the Criminal Code nor consistent with sections 2(b), (c) and (d), 7 and 11(e) of the Charter. Given the complaints of Mr. Wood and the Association, I am satisfied that all three conditions in the undertaking document are properly before me for consideration and I propose to address all three.
15.6. Subsequent RCMP Explanations
Prior to the hearing, the RCMP publicly addressed the three conditions and acknowledged that an error was made in the drafting and inclusion of the third condition. Soon after the close of the APEC conference, the RCMP issued a document entitled "The Most Frequently Asked Questions About APEC Security Measures" which contained two questions and answers relevant to this issue:
Leading up to, and throughout the course of APEC, several persons were arrested and brought in with the intention that they be charged criminally. Some were released pending their appearance in Court by means of a "Recognizance Before an Officer in Charge" [of the local RCMP detachment]. Although the Criminal Code of Canada gives the police the authority to use such a bail document, why were these arrested persons asked to sign something which prevented them from going within 100 metres of an APEC venue and/or an IPP?
One hundred metres was thought to be "reasonable and proper" within the context of the protection of IPPs.
It was intended to prevent the continuation of further alleged criminal offences, as is the duty of the RCMP to do in any event.
The police also asked these arrested persons to sign a document which prevented them from participating in, or being in attendance at, any anti-APEC public demonstration or rally?
The use of this particular bail condition was unfortunate. If the RCMP were to do this over again, it would not have employed such a condition.
Although it was not intended that these arrested persons be prevented from exercising their rights to freedom of expression and association, the wording of this particular condition nonetheless had that effect.
It was a mistake which will not be repeated.
A/Comm. Johnston said, in reply to a question about his input into that answer:
When I saw the various release conditions, and I saw that one, and I--it was my opinion that that was inappropriate, that--that we should not be restricting people from--from demonstrating away from the various events. And, in my opinion, it was inappropriate to have that specific condition in there, and I said that we should advise the public that it was an inappropriate condition; and admit that it was wrong.
15.7. Are the Conditions Appropriate and Consistent with the Charter?
15.7.1. Third Condition: a Blanket Prohibition
Sections 515(2) and (4) of the Criminal Code authorize a Justice of the Peace or a Provincial Court Judge to release an accused person on specified conditions, including such "reasonable conditions . . . as the justice considers desirable." In contrast, where it is a police officer who is releasing the person, section 503(2.1) of the Criminal Code applies. It specifies the conditions upon which an Officer in Charge may release an accused person and does not give a similarly broad discretion to determine and impose "reasonable conditions."
Counsel for the 44 RCMP members conceded that the third condition did not fall within the class of conditions set out in section 503(2.1) and overly restricted the Charter rights of the arrestees. Given that concession, and my own consideration of the matter, I am satisfied that the third condition was not authorized by the Criminal Code, was not consistent with sections 2(b), (c), (d) and 11(e) of the Charter, and was not "appropriate" to the circumstances. It was simply a blanket prohibition on political protest.
15.7.2. Criminal Code Authorizes First Condition
As to the first two conditions, Counsel for the 44 RCMP members submitted that they were authorized by section 503(2.1)(c) which permits an Officer in Charge to require a person, as a condition of release, to enter into an undertaking whereby the person agrees "to abstain... from going to a place specified in the undertaking, except in accordance with the conditions specified in the undertaking."
In my view, the first condition clearly required an accused to abstain from attending at specified locations and was, therefore, authorized by section 503(2.1)(c) of the Criminal Code.
15.7.3. Second Condition not Authorized
As to the second condition, when asked how he arrived at the 100 metre figure, which was included in both the first and second conditions, Cpl. Anderson answered:
That figure came right out of my head, and I felt that it was a safe distance for a person to--to be restricted from attending within that area. Believing in my own mind that at 100 meters distance a person would not be able to commit a criminal offense that would cause--you know, the average person wouldn't commit a criminal offense that would cause tremendous disruption to the functions that were ongoing.
I accept that as an honest answer.
Complainants' counsel submitted that the second condition was not authorized by the Criminal Code because section 503(2.1)(c) does not expressly permit an Officer in Charge to impose a "moving bubble zone around a large number of unnamed persons." No authorities were provided to me by any counsel as to the ambit of section 503(2.1)(c). In my view, the matter is not free from difficulty.
On the one hand, although section 503(2.1)(c) does not expressly refer to a "moving bubble zone," and does appear to require specificity, one must not lose sight of the purpose of the legislation: the provision allows police to prevent persons who have been charged with an offence from being at locations where they might reasonably be expected to commit further offences. The second condition was imposed to further that purpose by preventing persons who had demonstrated a willingness to break the law by requiring them, upon notice, to maintain a 100 metre distance from an Internationally Protected Person or official delegate. The fact that the condition did not expressly refer to every possible location at which the APEC leaders may have been located at any given moment is neither surprising nor, arguably, fatal.
On the other hand, the general principle regarding the construction of penal provisions is that they should be interpreted in the manner most favourable to the accused. As stated by Lamer C.J.C. in R. v. McIntosh, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 686:
It is a principle of statutory interpretation that where two interpretations of a provision which affects the liberty of a subject are available, one of which is more favourable to an accused, then the court should adopt this favourable interpretation.
Although the importance of this principle is perhaps magnified when an accused faces incarceration, it has been applied in the context of section 515(4) of the Criminal Code (R. v. S.K., [1998] S.J. No. 863 (Prov. Ct.)) and, therefore, must be equally applicable to section 503(2.1)(c). That section specifically provides that an officer may require a person to undertake "to abstain . . . from going to a place specified in the undertaking, except in accordance with the conditions specified in the undertaking."
The problem with the second condition is that it did not require the accused to abstain from "going to a place specified in the undertaking." Rather, it was intended to create, as stated by Complainants' counsel, a "moving bubble zone" around the Internationally Protected Persons and APEC officials, at locations that were obviously impossible to specify.
In addition, the condition did not in fact prevent the accused from "going to a place" at all; rather, it required the accused to depart from a place upon being notified that they were within a 100 metre radius of the Internationally Protected Persons. Although this may well be a distinction without a practical difference, the rules of statutory interpretation compel me to interpret section 503(2.1)(c) in a manner most favourable to the accused. Therefore, I have concluded that the second condition was not authorized by section 503(2.1)(c) of the Criminal Code.
15.7.4. First and Second Conditions Unconstitutional and Inappropriate
Having determined that the first condition was authorized by section 503(2.1)(c) of the Criminal Code and that the second was not, the remaining issues are:
- whether the two conditions were consistent with the Charter; and
- whether they were "appropriate to the circumstances."
Counsel for the 44 RCMP members submitted that the first and second conditions "[did] not impose an unreasonable limit on the liberties of the released person, who remain[ed] free to stand 101 meters away from APEC venues, delegates or IPPs without breaching his undertaking." In contrast, Complainants' counsel suggested that requiring the accused to sign the undertaking with the second and third conditions violated their rights under sections 2, 7 and 11(e) of the Charter.
I believe it is unnecessary to consider section 7 (life, liberty and security of the person), as the undertaking did not affect the "life" or "security" interests of the accused persons. As to their "liberty" interests, I agree with the following statement by Professor Peter Hogg (Constitutional Law of Canada, looseleaf edition, v.2):
"Liberty" does not include freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, the right to vote and be a candidate for election, or the right to travel. These rights are all guaranteed elsewhere in the Charter of Rights, and should be excluded from s. 7.
It follows that the Charter rights in issue are sections 2(b), (c), (d) and 11(e). Commission Counsel and Complainants' counsel emphasized the decisions in Re Keenan and The Queen (1979), 57 C.C.C. (2d) 267 (Que. C.A.) and Collins v. The Queen (1982), 4 C.R.R. 78 (Ont. Co. Ct.). In Keenan, Lamer J.A. made it clear that, at the stage of a bail hearing, as opposed to a probation order, the presumption of innocence is still in effect and must guide the judge in imposing appropriate conditions of release. He also held that there must be a causal relationship between the conditions imposed on an accused and the dangers presented by the circumstances of the alleged offence.
In Collins, the accused was charged with obstructing the police during an anti-nuclear demonstration at a plant that produced electronic parts for cruise missiles. A bomb had been detonated near the plant the previous month, causing considerable damage. There was no evidence that the accused was involved in the bombing, and he was not a suspect, although he had earlier been convicted for trespassing at the plant. The accused was released on bail, subject to the conditions that he:
- not attend at, demonstrate, obstruct or in any way cause a disturbance within one half mile from the plant; and
- not incite or encourage anyone to do the former.
In the appeal against the conditions, the court made it clear that courts cannot impose conditions contrary to an accused's Charter rights on a "speculative concern of danger." Rather, the conditions must:
- further a "compelling state interest" unrelated to the suppression of expression and be no greater than necessary to protect the public; and
- be precisely drawn without any unnecessary erosion of rights.
After stating that it was also necessary to consider the "nature of the offence, the accused's criminal record or other information tending to show violence or anti-social behaviour of a dangerous nature on his behalf, and all the surrounding circumstances," the court ordered the deletion of the two conditions. The court appeared to be primarily concerned with the condition that the accused not "incite" or "encourage" anyone to protest at the plant, which would make it a crime punishable by imprisonment to "encourage others to take part in a lawful demonstration, to place papers in envelopes or to address correspondence."
The first condition imposed in this case was designed to ensure that none of the accused persons came within 100 metres of any APEC venues, regardless of whether APEC officials were even present, for the entire week of the APEC conference. Although Complainants' counsel did not object to the first condition, I am of the view that it was neither consistent with sections 2(b) or 11(e) of the Charter nor "appropriate" to the circumstances for these reasons:
- Firstly, the alleged offences were minor in nature. The six were accused of simply refusing to leave the museum grounds upon police request. In my view, although the accused thereby demonstrated a willingness to break the law, the RCMP did not have reasonable grounds to believe that they represented anything other than a "speculative" threat to the Internationally Protected Persons and APEC officials such that they had to be restricted from coming within 100 metres of them, wherever they may be. There is no doubt that drawing appropriate conditions of release can be a difficult task for Crown Counsel, and perhaps more so for RCMP members. I am certain that their overriding concern was that persons who had shown themselves willing to break the law not be present to disrupt the balance of the APEC conference or pose a threat to Internationally Protected Persons. It must always be borne in mind that the RCMP had an enormous responsibility to ensure the safety of these visitors and, if a person released without conditions were to injure one of them, the RCMP would be subject to intense criticism. I also appreciate that I am viewing this matter with the benefit of hindsight. Nevertheless, in this instance, any risk of danger was "speculative" and, given Collins, insufficient to warrant the restriction.
- Secondly, and more importantly, one need only consider the practical effect of the first condition to see that it was overbroad. The accused were prohibited from attending within 100 metres of 10 specified buildings located in different parts of downtown Vancouver where foreign government officials "may be in attendance" between specified dates. The condition is not at all clear as to whether the accused were required to obey the prohibition at all times, regardless of whether any officials were in fact within such buildings. Although the intent of the condition may have been to prohibit the accused from infringing the area restriction only if the officials were within the building in question, the condition reads, or can reasonably be read, as a blanket prohibition against being in downtown Vancouver, regardless of whether APEC officials were inside any of the specified buildings. As a result, the practical effect of the condition was to preclude the accused from visiting the bulk of downtown Vancouver.
I am satisfied that the first condition was inconsistent with the Charter and unjustifiable in the circumstances. Although it may have been imposed in furtherance of a "pressing and substantial objective" (i.e., the protection of the Internationally Protected Persons) and may have been "rationally connected" to that objective, the objective could have been met without, in effect, making it a criminal offence for the accused to visit downtown Vancouver.
Furthermore, given the "speculative" nature of the risk posed by the accused, it is my view that the negative impact on freedom of expression caused by the first condition was not outweighed by its benefits and therefore the condition cannot withstand scrutiny under the third branch of the proportionality test, as modified by the Supreme Court of Canada in Dagenais v. CBC, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835. It was overbroad and ambiguous and, following the Collins analysis, it was not "precisely drawn without any unnecessary erosion of rights." Having found that the RCMP conduct in question was inconsistent with the Charter, I am also satisfied that it was not "appropriate" to the circumstances.
As to the second condition, I am satisfied that it limited the rights of the accused provided by sections 2(b) and 11(e) of the Charter and that it was not authorized by section 503(2.1)(c) of the Criminal Code. As a result, it was not "prescribed by law" within the meaning of section 1 of the Charter and was, therefore, unjustifiable. It follows that it was not appropriate to the circumstances. I should note, however, that had the condition been imposed by a Justice of the Peace or a Provincial Court Judge pursuant to section 515(4), it may well have passed constitutional muster.
Having found that each of the three conditions was inconsistent with section 2(b) and 11(e) of the Charter, it is not necessary to go on to consider whether they conflict with section 2(c) and (d).
15.8. Recommendations for the Future
15.8.1. B.C. Civil Liberties Association Recommendations
In its desire to eliminate "similar errors" by the RCMP in the future, counsel for the B.C. Civil Liberties Association made the following points which will receive further consideration in Chapter 31 of this report:
As a preliminary point, having recourse to legal counsel when drafting documents of this sort would seem to be a sensible precaution.
Even without legal counsel, the RCMP could have asked itself the following questions concerning the undertaking, any one of which might have been sufficient to alert it to the problems inherent in the undertaking:
- will anyone signing this protest [sic] still be able to engage in meaningful protest or will the undertaking preclude that?
- does the undertaking impair the rights of persons signing it to the minimum degree possible, or does it go further than that?
- are we doing our utmost to ensure that we comply with the relevant Charter provisions and jurisprudence?
15.8.2. Cpl. Harrison's Recommendations
Other recommendations that I will consider in Chapter 31 were made by Cpl. Harrison in his final report prepared on November 27, 1997. In that report, Cpl. Harrison acknowledged the error in having the conditions in an Undertaking and Release form imposed by an Officer in Charge rather than a Justice of the Peace.
He also referred in that report to his belief that many people who should have been aware of and familiar with the Operational Plan were not. In his evidence, he said that he was given no opportunity to brief those he described as venue or site commanders, even though such briefings were called for in the Operational Plan. He also expressed regret in not having had the opportunity to brief the Quick Response Team members who he believed would and in fact, did, make the vast majority of arrests involved in the whole process. He said that the investigating and arresting officers were not aware that they were to take action and provide details of the arrests and prepare the report to Crown Counsel if one were required.
15.9. Undertakings Should be Prepared with Legal Advice
Often there will be a "compelling state interest" in taking steps to prevent those who have shown a willingness to break the law from being allowed close to Internationally Protected Persons, as they might act unlawfully again. The difficulty facing the police when they control the release of an accused is determining the proper nature and extent of any restrictions they may choose to impose. This is a complex task, as it requires the police to assess the factors listed in Collins; namely, the "nature of the offence, the accused's criminal record or other information tending to show violence or anti-social behaviour of a dangerous nature on his behalf, and all the surrounding circumstances." They must also ensure that restrictions further a "compelling state interest," are "precisely drawn without any unnecessary erosion of rights" and are not imposed on a "speculative concern of danger."
As a general rule, for example, a person charged with obstructing a police officer in the course of civil disobedience during a passive political protest should not be burdened by the same restrictions as might be placed on a protester who commits a deliberate and serious assault. Clearly, the protester who commits such an assault presents a greater risk to Internationally Protected Persons than does a passive protester and, therefore, stricter conditions may well be justified. From a practical point of view, however, can the RCMP reasonably be expected, on the spot, to tailor each undertaking document to the degree of risk presented by each accused person and account for all of the surrounding circumstances without unnecessarily eroding Charter rights, all without the benefit of prior legal advice?
In the present case, the reality is that, given the magnitude of the anticipated protests, the RCMP quite rightly expected that people would be arrested and would be released on conditions. Therefore, they attempted to draw up a "catch-all" document, which prisoners were ultimately, and indiscriminately, required to sign. It was not vetted in advance by Crown Counsel and it was never intended to be used by an Officer in Charge.
If a police officer prepares an undertaking document before the fact, without knowledge of the specific offence in question and the background of the accused, and without the benefit of legal advice, it will be a rare case indeed where the undertaking will properly account for the considerations referred to in Collins. Therefore, my view is that the RCMP should, wherever possible, ensure that their undertaking documents have been prepared, or at least vetted, by Crown Counsel or a Department of Justice lawyer. Even this measure will not guarantee that the restrictions will suit the specific circumstances of each prisoner. Unfortunately, that practice was not followed in this case and, as a result, accused persons were required to sign a document which unreasonably restricted their personal freedoms.