Report Following a Public Interest Investigation into a Chair-Initiated Complaint Respecting the Death in RCMP Custody of Mr. Robert Dziekanski
Appendix O – Use of Force Report
As noted in the body of this report, I have not relied on the Use of Force Report prepared by Sergeant Brad Fawcett in my investigation. My comments and analysis of the Use of Force Report set out the reasons for non-reliance.
On March 3, 2008, a Use of Force Report was provided to IHIT investigators by Sergeant Fawcett, a member of the Vancouver Police Department. Sergeant Fawcett indicated in the document that he was providing an opinion at the request of IHIT, but did not indicate the question on which he was asked to opine.
The involvement of Sergeant Fawcett came about due to a November 23, 2007 letter from Superintendent Wayne Rideout, Officer in Charge of IHIT, to Chief Constable Jim Chiu, Chief of the Vancouver Police Department, requesting Sergeant Fawcett's services to provide an expert opinion on the use of force used by the four involved members. The letter requesting Sergeant Fawcett's assistance did not specify whether Sergeant Fawcett was to gauge the actions of the four RCMP members against RCMP policy, nor did it specify for Sergeant Fawcett the scope of his review.
Sergeant Fawcett stipulated in his report that he is qualified in assessing the adequacy and appropriateness of the force used by police and that he provides:
... expert opinions in the areas of Use of Force, Police Training and Training Standards, Non-Firearms Prohibited Weapons, Street Weapons, and Weapons Concealed by Design.
As will be discussed in more detail below, Sergeant Fawcett made certain assumptions which I did not find to be in evidence. For example, he attributed characteristics such as anger to Mr. Dziekanski, when Mr. Dziekanski's state of mind cannot be known. More importantly, Sergeant Fawcett assessed the actions of the responding RCMP members not by the training received by RCMP members pursuant to the IM/IM, but by what he perceived to be standard police training pursuant to the National Use of Force Framework (NUFF), and by threat cues he assumed or believed to have been perceived by the responding members. Although he may be correct in his assumptions concerning training, no mapping of RCMP training to the NUFF was provided as a concordance to enable the reader to accurately assess the response of the responding members based on the IM/IM. This is a fatal methodological flaw.
In his report, Sergeant Fawcett canvassed the witness statements of persons who observed the actions of Mr. Dziekanski and the interaction with the RCMP members, as well as the statements of the RCMP members, and reviewed video associated with the incident. Sergeant Fawcett then conducted an analysis of the events using the facts as known juxtaposed against the National Use of Force Framework,181 a document akin to the IM/IM. The NUFF is a document which, at the time of the YVR incident, was not used in RCMP training.
Following the scenario of the incident as visible in the Pritchard video, Sergeant Fawcett noted that the RCMP members, upon initially confronting Mr. Dziekanski, used the force response options of officer presence (four uniformed officers) and communication (informal greeting). He went on to say that the members did not take an aggressive stance and attempted to use hand signals with Mr. Dziekanski as a means of communicating with him and attempting to calm him.
Sergeant Fawcett pointed out that after Mr. Dziekanski put his arms in the air and walked away from them, the RCMP members fanned out around Mr. Dziekanski and maintained what is known as a reactionary gap. He stated that police across North America are trained to make use of such a space and defined the reactionary gap and its rationale as:
... the distance outside the longest technique of the subject, generally four to six feet for an apparently unarmed subject. A reactionary gap is used to provide officers with sufficient time to analyze, evaluate, plan, and initiate a physical response to threat stimulus. The time required is typically ¾ of a second. The reactionary gap concept takes into account the fact that subjects have the benefit of first act and the officers will also be responding to a threat stimulus that happened in the immediate past. It is hoped that maintaining a reactionary gap will provide officers with sufficient time to respond effectively to a spontaneous assault.
Fanning out around Mr. Dziekanski was, in Sergeant Fawcett's opinion, a reasonable approach and one that was tactically called for to avoid a situation in which the suspect could attack all of the police officers at one time.
Sergeant Fawcett stated that police training is to contain the problem in order to mitigate opportunities for the suspect to flee police and resume (the) behaviour elsewhere. He indicated that it also reduces the possibility of other persons unwittingly placing themselves in jeopardy by entering into an uncontrolled area.
Sergeant Fawcett pointed out that the intervention took place in an airport terminal and that it was reasonable for the RCMP members to anticipate that other travellers leaving the international arrivals area could enter into the situation at any time.
At the time Mr. Dziekanski picked up the stapler, the members can be seen on the Pritchard video to appear more concerned and Constable Bentley can be seen to take a step back. In Sergeant Fawcett's opinion, by acquiring the stapler for the purpose of using it as a weapon, Mr. Dziekanski elevated the level of demonstrated behaviour to assaultive. The National Use of Force Framework states that assaultive behaviour occurs when a person:
... attempts to apply, or applies force to any person; attempts or threatens by an act or gesture, to apply force to another person, if he/she has, or causes that other person to believe upon reasonable grounds that he/she has, present ability to effect his/her purpose. Examples include kicking and punching, but also include aggressive body language that signals the intent to assault.
The RCMP trains its members using the Incident Management/Intervention Model (IM/IM). The IM/IM does not recognize a resistance level known as assaultive behaviour, but like the NUFF, the IM/IM does recognize increasing levels of resistance (from cooperative to non-cooperative to resistant to combative to persons who show the potential to cause grievous bodily harm or death).
The lack of mapping between the NUFF, used by Sergeant Fawcett, and the IM/IM, is problematic. Sergeant Fawcett's report did not correlate one use of force measurement to the other; therefore, it cannot be stated with certainty how a term such as "assaultive behaviour" equates to the term "combative behaviour" as used in RCMP training.
The relevant IM/IM resistance levels in terms of the indications provided by the Pritchard video as well as the members' statements and those of other witnesses appear to be resistant leading to combative resistance. The resistant level is defined by the IM/IM as:
The person demonstrates resistance to control by the police officer through behaviours such as pulling away, pushing away or running away. This can include a situation where a police officer activates a police vehicle's emergency equipment and the suspect fails to stop and attempts to evade apprehension by driving evasively.
Combative, which is how the RCMP members who attended described Mr. Dziekanski, is defined in the IM/IM as:
The person attempts or threatens to apply force to anyone, e.g. punching, kicking, clenching fists with intent to hurt or resists, threats of an assault. In the case of a person operating a vehicle, they attempt to collide with the police vehicle, another vehicle or a pedestrian.
However it is characterized, the rationale for the increased level of aggression is that by potentially using the stapler as a weapon of opportunity, Mr. Dziekanski increased the level of harm that he was capable of producing. Sergeant Fawcett stated:
A stapler held in a fist maintains the integrity of the fist upon impact, adds weight to a punch, and provides a variety of impact surfaces (a subject can strike with a "loaded fist" or with the top or bottom of the stapler. ... The behaviour demonstrated by the deceased is classified as Assaultive. ... He had the apparent means, ability, intent, and opportunity to assault the officers or anyone else who entered into the immediate area.
Sergeant Fawcett does not explain how an open stapler equates to a "loaded fist." To the uninitiated, an open stapler (as visible in the Pritchard video, half of the stapler unit was moving freely outside of Mr. Dziekanski's fist), used as a means to buttress a punch, would appear to result in potential injury to the hand of the person holding the stapler if it folded on itself.
Sergeant Fawcett stated that the reactionary gap should be increased when a subject is armed or demonstrates what he described as "pre-assault cues." These include the following gestures and actions:
- Clenching fists;
- "Thousand yard" stare;
- Balling of the masseter muscle (jaw clenching);
- Bladed stance relative to the officers;
- Adjusting their positions relative to the officers;
- Target glancing;
- Verbal threats; and
- Depersonalizing officers or others.
Sergeant Fawcett provided the above as examples of such pre-assault cues and stated that police officers are instructed to recognize pre-assault cues in order to defend themselves and/or others from assault they believe to be imminent.
The IM/IM used by the RCMP does not refer to "pre-assault cues." Rather, RCMP training teaches members to analyze "threat cues" through their interaction with an individual. In this regard, the IM/IM states:
Throughout the management of an incident, a police officer should be alert to threat cues such as body tension, tone of voice, body position and facial expression to ready them to use an appropriate response option. These threat cues may indicate the potential for a suspect to display more or less resistant behaviours described under "categories of resistance" that would justify the use of different "response options" ...
Overarching the IM/IM, RCMP members are trained using the CAPRA problem-solving model. CAPRA is an acronym standing for the processes included in the RCMP problem-solving model: Client/Acquiring and Analysing Information/Partnerships/Response/Assessment and Continuous Improvement. Fundamental to the RCMP CAPRA model are the concepts of finding alternative and preventing crime. Practitioners of CAPRA are encouraged to prevent:182
... the problem from occurring or from escalating by addressing contributing factors to the broad problem rather than specific incidents or manifestations of the issue.
The impact of the CAPRA model on the IM/IM and use of force options was not discussed by Sergeant Fawcett in his report.
Although Sergeant Fawcett's Use of Force Report does not address the issues from the point of view of RCMP training standards, there may be overlap in the concepts involved. Corporal Gregg Gillis, an RCMP use of force expert, responded as follows to questions from an external agency pertaining to situational factors:
Question 1:
... "situational factors" (within the meaning of the IMIM & Part 17.7[183] of the RCMP Operational Manual) include environmental conditions, number of subjects, perceived subjects' abilities, knowledge of subject, time & distance and potential attack signs....
Corporal Gillis confirmed that this is correct from an RCMP perspective.
This position was reiterated in his evidence before the Braidwood Inquiry, when Corporal Gillis said:
... each and every case has to be looked at on its own situational factors, the behaviours of the persons, the perceptions of the officers, and tactical considerations.
Question 2:
Does the term "situational factors" also include subject behaviours/categories of resistance such as combative behaviour or are subject behaviours/categories of resistance regarded as a different category of factors? ...
Corporal Gillis responded:
The behavior of the person or persons an officer is interacting with are [sic] a different category and not included in the Situational Factors[184] portion of the IMIM. The behavior of the person, or persons, is [sic] significant factor. The officer's perceptions of that behavior are critical in the risk assessment and related response as such it is a separate category or section of the IMIM and distinct from the "Situational Factors" area.
Corporal Gillis also stated that, in general, response options are aligned to the behaviour being exhibited to the police officer.
In his evidence before the Braidwood Inquiry, Corporal Gillis confirmed that the NUFF and the IM/IM are similar in nature, and provided an overview to the Commissioner of the two.
On July 29, 2009, Deputy Commissioner H.D.M. Madill, responsible for Contract and Aboriginal Policing provided me with a letter in which he provided an update on the status of the 22 recommendations arising from the interim and final reports (issued in December 2007 and June 2008, respectively) of the Commission pertaining to the RCMP's Use of the CEW. With respect to the alignment of the IM/IM and the NUFF, Deputy Commissioner. Madill stated:
On May 29, 2008 the RCMP approved a new Incident Management Intervention Model (IMIM) to align with the existing Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP) National Use of Force Framework (NUFF). The alignment of the IMIM and the NUFF will ensure commonality of language and terminology between the RCMP and other Canadian law enforcement agencies. The term "impact weapon" is no longer included in the new IMIM.
I was not provided with an RCMP analysis of the process of aligning the IM/IM and the NUFF to be able to comment with any insight on the rationale for the alignment, the process of carrying out the alignment or a means of gauging the appropriateness of the alignment, and more importantly, its outcome.
Use of Force Report and Deployment of the CEW
Within four seconds of Mr. Dziekanski picking up the stapler, Constable Millington discharged the CEW in probe mode. The video does not indicate at what point Constable Millington withdrew the CEW from its holster (because he is out of frame), but it does not appear to be in his hand when Constable Millington was last in frame. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that Constable Millington drew the weapon at the time Mr. Dziekanski picked up the stapler and Constable Millington became concerned that Mr. Dziekanski could use the stapler as a weapon.
Assuming that the time required to draw and point the CEW is approximately two seconds, any assessment carried out by Constable Millington that the stapler in the hands of Mr. Dziekanski constituted a weapon took place in less than the remaining two seconds. Police officers are required to make very quick decisions, often under very trying circumstances. Had Mr. Dziekanski held a more robust weapon, such as a letter opener, a piece of pipe or a chair, for example, the quickness of the decision to deploy the CEW would perhaps have been more articulable and understandable.
Sergeant Fawcett categorized the CEW as an intermediate weapon, in the same category as OC spray and other such weapons. This categorization of the CEW and OC spray is supported by the IM/IM. The police baton, at that time, was considered an impact weapon pursuant to the IM/IM.185
As the members entered the scene, and as pointed out by Sergeant Fawcett, at least two of them contemplated the use of the CEW. This is supported by the fact that as they entered the YVR terminal, Constable Bentley asked Constable Millington (the only member in possession of a CEW that night) whether he had the CEW with him. Constable Millington replied in the affirmative.
Sergeant Fawcett believed that consideration of the CEW as an option was reasonable because of the information the RCMP members had received via radio prior to arriving at the scene as well as their observations upon arrival. It will be recalled that the members responding believed that the male could be intoxicated and that he had already demonstrated violent behaviour. It will be recalled as well that Superintendent Rideout indicated to the Commission that IHIT had no knowledge of the responding members' predetermining that the CEW would be deployed against Mr. Dziekanski.
I agree that consideration of the CEW was reasonable. Deployment of the weapon as it actually occurred, however, was not.
Sergeant Fawcett stated that OC spray:
... has been shown to have a significant failure rate when used on subjects intoxicated by drugs and/or alcohol, subjects who are mentally ill, and/or subjects that are goal oriented. Officers had been informed that the deceased appeared to be intoxicated and the officers, based on their observations and information provided to them by police dispatch and witnesses could suspect that he might be suffering from a mental illness.
These statements, written by Sergeant Fawcett in his report dated March 8, 2008, are entirely speculative. Because he referred in the report to injuries received by Mr. Dziekanski which were noted during the autopsy, I assume that Sergeant Fawcett had read the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Lee. Sergeant Fawcett would therefore have known that the autopsy report of Dr. Lee, received by the BC Ministry of the Solicitor General on January 29, 2008, indicated that no drugs or alcohol were found in Mr. Dziekanski's body (although the responding RCMP members would not have know this at the time of the incident).
Further, although the responding members had been informed by radio dispatch that Mr. Dziekanski appeared to be intoxicated, none of the members indicated in their statements that they suspected from their observations at the scene that Mr. Dziekanski was intoxicated or suspected that he suffered from a mental illness. They did note the destruction of property (computer and chair) at the scene.
Sergeant Fawcett postulated that the members responding:
... also have to consider the tactical environment in which the incident was occurring. The use of oleoresin capsicum spray would result in significant contamination in a closed environment. Anyone coming into the area could be impacted.
Some of the responding members did express a concern that OC spray would contaminate the area.
Sergeant Fawcett considered the possibility of the use of the police baton during the incident. His opinion was that using the baton would have required the members to close the reactionary gap between them and Mr. Dziekanski, thereby placing them at greater risk of injury from the weapon of opportunity (the stapler) possessed by Mr. Dziekanski. Further, closing the reactionary gap would have compromised the ability of Constable Millington (the only member equipped with a CEW) to acquire Mr. Dziekanski as a target because the other members would be in the field of view.
Sergeant Fawcett was of the view that the use of the baton was not appropriate because baton blows to Mr. Dziekanski would have caused significant bruising and potentially more serious injuries.
In his Use of Force Report, Sergeant Fawcett considered the possible option of the four members physically controlling Mr. Dziekanski without the aid of any tactical weapons. He formed the opinion that:
Engaging the subject in a physical struggle would have been contrary to training with regards to the One-Plus-Theory. ... The officers could reasonably expect that anyone involved in a physical struggle (themselves, the deceased, or bystanders) may suffer an injury. A concern for the officers when considering the use of Physical Control as a force response option is the fact that they would likely be precluding Constable MILLINGTON from using his conducted energy device should their efforts at establishing physical control fail. The use of physical control tactics is strongly influenced by officer characteristics such as confidence in his or her abilities, previous successes or failures, his or her perception of the subject's ability to resist, and many other variables. Subject characteristics and environmental considerations may also influence an individual officer's decision to preclude the use [of] Physical Control in a given situation. Attempting physical control, while not prohibited, would be contrary to the One-Plus-one Theory.
In my opinion, the decisions taken by the responding members, particularly Constable Millington, were based on more than what Sergeant Fawcett considered to be their perceptions as they responded to Mr. Dziekanski. The training received by these members, coupled with what Sergeant Fawcett described as their past experience with similar situations (to the best of my knowledge, none of the responding members had encountered a situation such as the one involving Mr. Dziekanski previously), and the knowledge that several people were witnessing their actions likely created a mindset within which the members responded to the situation which presented itself that night.
Sergeant Fawcett discussed various use of force options available to the RCMP members who responded. He stated that:
RCMP Officers have been instructed in the area of Force Options Theory contained within the Incident Management and Intervention Model (IMIM) and the One Plus One Theory. Force Options Theory advocates that officers are not required to incrementally escalate through all categories of force options before they determine the appropriate use of force response. There are many circumstances, such as the incident in question, where it is reasonable and appropriate to escalate from Officer Presence to Intermediate Weapons without attempting Physical Control. The decision to escalate their force response option should be based upon preclusion: lower force options would be inappropriate and/or ineffective. The officers involved in the incident had attempted the force response options of Officer Presence and Communications, both of which failed to gain the deceased's voluntary compliance. High-level officer presence (multiple uniformed officers) and Communications had failed to gain the deceased's voluntary compliance.
The One-Plus-One Theory advocates that police offices [sic] respond to subject behaviours with a force response option one "level" greater than that demonstrated by the subject(s). Additionally, should an officer discover one weapon on a subject they are to assume there is a second one they have not yet discovered. In the incident in question the officers were responding to a subject armed with a weapon, albeit one limited to close quarters tactics. The officers responded with a CED, which allowed them to remain outside the effective range of the subject. Doing so was consistent with the One-Plus-One Theory.
Sergeant Fawcett concluded that:
The actions of the officers in this incident represent a reasonable escalation and de-escalation of force based upon the actions of the subject.
From my review of the available video, I noted no de-escalation of force by the responding members. Sergeant Fawcett cited his reasoning as follows:
The officers precluded lower force options, specifically high level Officer Presence in conjunction with Communications, by virtue of the fact that they had been attempted and failed. Once Officer Presence and Tactical Communications fail officers must necessarily escalate to the application of physical force. The officers used an Intermediate Weapon, specifically a conducted energy weapon, in conjunction with Physical Control to gain control of DZIEKANSKI. The officers' actions were consistent with their Common Law duties, various Criminal Code (Canada) provisions and RCMP policy and training.
Sergeant Fawcett did not provide a temporal discussion with respect to the failure of officer presence and communications. He did not suggest how much time is enough time to have attempted a particular tactic in order for officers to determine whether it is successful, nor is there a discussion of what elements constitute failure or how failure is measured.
Sergeant Fawcett stated:
The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable peace officer on the scene, rather than with 20/20 vision of hindsight. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that peace officers are often forced to make split second judgements in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving. These circumstances inflict neurological and physiological responses of fight, flight, posture, and submit on the officer, and may influence the determination of the level of force considered necessary by the peace officer in a particular situation. The courts have said that the peace officer cannot be expected to measure the force used with exactitude (R. v. Bottrell: 60 C.C.C (2d) 211).
DZIEKANSKI'S intentions when angrily damaging property and grabbing the stapler may have been for innocent purposes however the officers involved had no way of knowing this. There has been an extraordinary media outcry regarding the reasonableness of the use of force decisions made by the officers involved in the incident. It should be noted, however, that media and/or public perception of the incident do not determine the reasonableness of the officers' use of force.
Various media have asserted that DZIEKANSKI needed "help". It must be realized that no other assistance, medical or otherwise, could be provided until control had been established. The many callers to 9-1-1 and airport security called for the police, not Emergency Health Services.
It is responsible to point out that, while the author and reader have had the opportunity to view the videos provided numerous times, in slow motion, and stop action – the officers involved in the incident did not. Their decisions were based upon their perceptions, which evolved from the dispatched information, witnesses statements made to them upon arrival, and their own observations. Their perceptions are influenced by their training, past experience with similar situations, and the knowledge that several people were witnessing their actions.
In my opinion, the decisions taken by the responding members, particularly Constable Millington, were based on more than perceptions. The training received by these members, coupled with what Sergeant Fawcett described as their past experience with similar situations, and the knowledge that several people were witnessing their actions actually created a mindset within which the members responded to the situation which presented itself that night. RCMP CEW training teaches that the CEW is a less lethal intervention to control suspects. The implication, therefore, is that RCMP members are trained to view the CEW as a more humane manner of carrying out an arrest in order to mitigate and minimize potential injuries to the police, to the suspect and to bystanders.
Given that Constable Millington had completed his CEW training in July 2007, only three months prior to the YVR incident, it is foreseeable that Constable Millington's training would have been relatively fresh in his mind and he might well have been more inclined to deploy the CEW.
Sergeant Fawcett cited the 1999 decision of the Honourable Madam Justice Southin of the British Columbia Court of Appeal:186
What a judge must not do in a case such as this is take into account in determining the issue of "reasonable grounds" what the person injured was in fact intending to do, nor the actual consequences of the force used, no matter how tragic.
Sergeant Fawcett's analysis, cited above, considered various use of force options and discussed the possibility that RCMP members, civilians or the suspect could be injured in the event that a confrontation took place which involved hand to hand physical force. Although he did consider options ranging from officer presence to use of the baton, his analysis did not take into consideration soft and hard empty hand control techniques as taught to RCMP members as part of the use of force process. Prior to the deployment of the CEW, no soft or hard empty hand control techniques were used in the arrest of Mr. Dziekanski.
The distinction is important in that these options, particularly soft empty hand control techniques, include joint locks. Sergeant Fawcett did briefly discuss the use of superior strength by police officers in effecting an arrest (which he called physical control) and which allows for the use of joint locks. He did not, however, discuss the relative merits of such procedures versus use of the CEW.
In using techniques such as joint locks, the individual officer is able to apply the requisite amount of force to achieve the goal of compliance. The CEW does not allow for such variation in force; when the CEW is deployed, the full voltage is applied to the recipient and the officer deploying the CEW is not able to vary the current to achieve the desired outcome. This issue was not canvassed by Sergeant Fawcett's report.
Consideration of the entire range of use of force options available was a reasonable and necessary step not only for Constable Millington, but for all of the responding members in determining how best to deal with Mr. Dziekanski. Use of the CEW is but one aspect of the range of options. Given the apparent level of threat posed by Mr. Dziekanski as captured on the Pritchard video, resorting to and deploying the CEW in such a short time span is problematic.
I have concerns with respect to the analysis conducted by Sergeant Fawcett because his analysis does not bring the use of force as trained by the RCMP into primary focus. Rather, he uses the National Use of Force Framework as his policy guide. While this document may be relevant for many police forces across Canada, it is not the training standard of the RCMP. Further, he does not directly tie his analysis into specific aspects of even the NUFF.
Although the principles are similar, and although I have no reason to doubt that Sergeant Fawcett's intention was to identify best practices, it is unfortunate that Sergeant Fawcett did not analyze the appropriateness of the RCMP response in light of the training provided to RCMP members.
Discussion in Sergeant Fawcett's report surrounding issues such as the appropriateness of the One Plus One Theory, and the reasonableness of the RCMP members' beliefs concerning the response to Mr. Dziekanski, especially in light of the inability of the RCMP members to recall in their statements the events as depicted in the Pritchard video, would have been helpful.
Further, I take issue with Sergeant Fawcett ascribing a state of mind to Mr. Dziekanski, which may give the appearance that Sergeant Fawcett exhibited bias in his assessment of the situation. For example, Sergeant Fawcett refers to Mr. Dziekanski "angrily" damaging property. Language such as this can only be supposition on Sergeant Fawcett's part; he cannot know what Mr. Dziekanski's state of mind was at the time.
Sergeant Fawcett also addressed media reports that Mr. Dziekanski needed help and pointed out that 911 callers asked for the police and not Emergency Health Services. Sergeant Fawcett was asked to provide his assessment of the reasonableness of the force used by responding RCMP members, not to address extraneous issues. By providing such unsolicited comments, Sergeant Fawcett called into question his objectivity.
I note that Corporal Gregg Gillis, an RCMP member recognized as a use of force expert, is of the view that Sergeant Fawcett's report is not inconsistent with RCMP training. Semantics and descriptors may differ, but Corporal Gillis' view is that the overarching principles enumerated by Sergeant Fawcett are sound. While not in any way undermining Corporal Gillis' reputation, I note as well that it was Corporal Gillis who trained Constable Millington in the use of the CEW. The coordinator for the CEW user courses taken by Constables Bentley and Rundel was also Corporal Gillis. Constable Rundel indicated in his statement that his CEW instructor was Corporal Gillis. As such, any opinion provided by Corporal Gillis would, at the very least, create the perception of bias.
181 According to a May 2009 article appearing in Police Chief Magazine (see Canada's National Use-of-Force Framework for Police Officers), the National Use of Force Framework began development in 1999 by police use of force trainers from across Canada and the United States to provide consistent and mandated use of force standards.
182 See: RCMP CAPRA Problem Solving Model.
183 OM 17.7 is the chapter which deals with the CEW.
184 It should be noted that situational factors are included in CAPRA, the risk assessment/problem-solving process taught to RCMP members. Situational factors are also considered when assessing the appropriateness of the use of the CEW and will be discussed further in that context.
185 In May 2008 the RCMP approved amendments to the IM/IM which removed the category of Impact Weapons.
186 Berntt v. Vancouver: BCCA 1999 345. See also Berntt v. Vancouver (City of), 2001 BCSC 1754 (CanLII). See also the December 14, 2001 decision of the BCSC in this matter which also cites the above quote of Southin JA - (2001), 209 D.L.R. (4th) 494.