The following table illustrates the conduct of the responding members as it aligns with policy in existence at that time (October 2007):
| Conduct |
Policy |
|
|
Constable Millington conducted "spark test" at the beginning of his shift.
|
OM 17.7.2.2.2 did not specifically require a spark test; however, it did indicate that the sole means of ensuring the operability of the CEW is the use of a spark test. CEW download report indicated that a spark test was conducted. |
Constable Millington used Taser® Model X26E. |
Taser® Models M26 (model 4400) and X26E are approved – OM 17.7.1.1. |
Constable Millington was qualified to use CEW. |
Certification required by OM 17.7.1.3. |
Four members responded to complaint of erratic behaviour from male. |
Consistent with 17.7.3.2.4.1.2. |
Failure of members at the scene to gather information and adequately assess risk. |
Not consistent with CAPRA model. |
Constable Millington "used" CEW. |
Use meets definition as per 17.7.2.4. |
Only Constable Millington used CEW. |
Consistent with 17.7.3.2.4.1.3. |
Constable Rundel considered excited delirium as possible aggravating factor re Mr. Dziekanski. Others may have considered it, but did not mention it in their statements. |
Excited delirium defined at OM 17.7.2.7. See 17.7.3.2 re issues involving ED.
|
CEW warning not given. |
Not consistent with OM 17.7.3.1.2. |
Constable Millington deployed CEW against Mr. Dziekanski. Millington says Dziekanski was sweaty/clammy..., paranoid..., under the influence of something, but doesn't use words "excited delirium". Statements of responding members indicate they considered other use of force options. |
Millington's statement is consistent with IM/IM examples of excited delirium. See OM 17.7.2.7.1.
|
Constable Millington first used CEW in probe mode before using it in push stun mode. |
Consistent with 17.7.3.2.3.
|
CEW was used for multiple cycles.
|
Not consistent with 17.7.3.1.3 – Multiple deployment or continuous cycling of the CEW may be hazardous to a subject. CEW should not be cycled repeatedly unless situational factors dictate otherwise. |
Members did not attempt to take control of Mr. Dziekanski during the first deployment of the CEW in probe mode.
|
Not consistent with 17.7.3.1.4 – Unless situational factors dictate otherwise, make every effort to take control of the subject as soon as possible during a CEW probe mode deployment. |
EHS was not present at time members responded. Members did not anticipate a need for medical intervention. |
Consistent with 17.7.3.2.4.
|
EHS was called within seconds of Mr. Dziekanski becoming unconscious. |
Consistent with 17.7.3.2.4.1.7. |
EHS requested Code 3 when Mr. Dziekanski went unconscious and was seen to be turning blue. |
Consistent with 17.7.3.2.4.1.7.
|
Members controlled Mr. Dziekanski's arms and legs during CEW deployment/struggle to subdue. |
Consistent with 17.7.3.2.4.1.4.
|
Mr. Dziekanski was moved from the prone to semi-recovery position after control was established, although he remained handcuffed. |
Partially consistent with 17.7.3.2.4.1.6.
|
Although EHS was called, members did not adequately monitor Mr. Dziekanski's vital signs or recognize the level of distress he was suffering. Handcuffs remained in place. |
Not consistent with 17.7.5.2.
|
Failure to adequately document the incident in notes. |
Not consistent with OM 25.2.2.1. |
Constable Millington filed a Conducted Energy Weapon Usage Report (Form 3996) upon completion of his shift the night of the incident. |
Filing of the document is consistent with 17.7.6.1.3. The content of Form 3996 is significantly misaligned with the video evidence. |
Data was downloaded from the CEW after the YVR incident. |
Contemplated at OM 17.7.2.8. |
Appearances are that prescriptive policy was generally complied with. Those areas in which compliance was not noted deal primarily with aspects of the application of policy involving judgement. In addition, the members appear not to possess an understanding and appreciation for the nature of the CEW as a weapon.
The Pritchard video does support Constable Millington's contention that Mr. Dziekanski stepped back and away from the members shortly after they arrived. It does not, however, support Constable Millington's justification for unholstering the CEW when he stated that Mr. Dziekanski swung the stapler wildly with his arm at the members, that Mr. Dziekanski raised the stapler in one hand and raised the other fist, or that Mr. Dziekanski then aggressively moved towards members on scene. The video clearly demonstrated that at the time Constable Millington discharged the CEW, Mr. Dziekanski was standing at the counter with his arms by his sides.
Given that the stapler is clearly visible in his right hand after he was struck by the CEW probes, it is likely that Mr. Dziekanski did pick up the stapler as he approached the counter. However, since his hands were not visible in the video it is not possible to know at what point exactly when.
4. Constable Millington indicated in his Form 3996 that:
The Pritchard video suggests that after the responding members fanned out around Mr. Dziekanski (during which time Constable Millington appears to have unholstered the CEW) and prior to the discharge of the CEW, Mr. Dziekanski glanced at Constable Millington (to the far left of Mr. Dziekanski) for at most a second, just as the CEW was fired. In my view, Mr. Dziekanski did not have time to register apprehension or any other emotion prior to the deployment of the CEW.
I do not accept any of the versions of events as presented by the involved members because I note so many discrepancies in the detail and accuracy of the recollections of the members when tracked against video evidence.
All of the foregoing was canvassed and confirmed by evidence given by the responding members during the Braidwood hearings.