Report Following a Public Interest Investigation into a Chair-Initiated Complaint Respecting the Death in RCMP Custody of Mr. Robert Dziekanski
Appendix S – Media Releases
The issue of misstatements and/or the provision of misinformation to the media, and ultimately to the public, by the RCMP have become issues with respect to the investigation into the death of Mr. Dziekanski. As part of my investigation in this matter I identified these issues as being worthy of comment.
On November 13, 2007190 the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (BCCLA) initiated a public complaint pursuant to Part VII of the RCMP Act, pertaining to the lack of accuracy of information provided to the media and the failure of the RCMP to return the video taken by Mr. Pritchard in a timely manner. These actions were characterized by the BCCLA as violations of RCMP policy and professional misconduct on the part of the involved RCMP members.
The complaint was investigated by the RCMP as per Part VII of the RCMP Act; however, the BCCLA was not satisfied with the RCMP investigation into its complaint (as per the RCMP letter of disposition to the BCCLA dated December 23, 2008). In a letter I received from the BCCLA dated March 19, 2009, subsequent to my decision to comment in this report on issues involving RCMP media releases, the Commission was requested to review the RCMP investigation into the BCCLA complaint pertaining to RCMP media releases (pursuant to Part VII of the RCMP Act). I will accede to that request.
Because the BCCLA request for review is inextricably linked to the overall investigation into the death of Mr. Dziekanski, it is my intention to deal with the review in the context of this report. The correspondence from the BCCLA as well as the RCMP letter of disposition are appended to this report at Appendix C and Appendix D, respectively.
As noted, the November 13, 2007 complaint by the BCCLA contained a number of issues which may be categorized into several broad areas:
- The failure to return the Pritchard video in a timely manner
- Content and accuracy of RCMP media releases
- The investigation into the BCCLA complaint
The allegation concerning the failure of the RCMP to return the Pritchard video has been addressed elsewhere in this report (see Section titled Pritchard Video). Issues pertaining to RCMP media releases and the nature of the RCMP investigation into the BCCLA complaint are addressed below.
Allegations of inaccuracies in RCMP media releases in the early stages of the investigation into the death of Mr. Dziekanski may be characterized into three principle areas. First are the allegations of factual errors provided by the RCMP media relations officer (MRO), who, in the early days of the investigation was Sergeant Pierre Lemaitre, "E" Division Strategic Communications (Sergeant Lemaitre was replaced as MRO by Corporal Dale Carr, the MRO for IHIT). Second are the allegations of gratuitous comments and apparent hypothesizing engaged in by Sergeant Lemaitre. Third is the failure to correct known factual errors in information provided by the MROs.
The BCCLA complaint identified a number of facts in various media news articles in which the MRO was quoted and which were subsequently shown to be false. The BCCLA complaint indicated that during media interviews Sergeant Lemaitre stated that:
- The attending RCMP members attempted to calm Mr. Dziekanski and used the CEW as a last resort;
- Mr. Dziekanski may have been under the influence of alcohol, drugs or had a medical condition that caused his death;
- Mr. Dziekanski was sweating profusely and was violent which could indicate either drug use or a medical condition and that there was obviously something very different going on inside of him.
Further, the BCCLA complaint stated that when Corporal Carr assumed the responsibility as MRO with respect to the death of Mr. Dziekanski, Corporal Carr:
- Stated that the Pritchard video was being withheld from the public to prevent witnesses account contamination but that the RCMP was continuing to publicly espouse subjective information about the incident thereby contaminating potential witness accounts to the detriment of Dziekanski and to the benefit of the RCMP;
- Stated that the Pritchard video recording was being withheld from the public to prevent upsetting Mrs. Cisowski (the decedent's mother), even though she and her lawyer wanted it released;
- Attacked Paul Pritchard's motive for release of the video.
Although the above are the examples cited in the BCCLA complaint, other misstatements have also been identified and my comments will include them.
The release of information by the RCMP to the media is governed by RCMP policy,191 which includes the requirement to ensure that information released to the media:
- Does not result in injury, injustice or embarrassment to the victims or the accused;
- Does not result in publicity that could affect the course of a trial;
- Does not contravene the provisions of the RCMP Act, Privacy Act, Access to Information Act, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms or the Canadian Human Rights Act.
Pursuant to that same policy, RCMP members when speaking with the media are advised not to speculate or offer a personal opinion. They should report only the facts.
Further, RCMP policy is that members are not to release information that would compromise an investigation or individual rights.192 All information released to the media must present the views of the RCMP and any of its partner stakeholders.193 I presume this final caveat to be interpreted by the RCMP such that the views of the RCMP and its partner stakeholders, when viewed in the context of the overall RCMP media policy, are that RCMP MROs are expected to provide a factual and non-biased version of events to the media.
According to an internal RCMP report titled A Review of Communications Surrounding the 2007 YVR Incident prepared in May 2008, during the month following the death of Mr. Dziekanski, over 1,000 e-mails were exchanged within the RCMP with respect to the creation of the media strategy to address that incident.194 The review examined the RCMP's media response to the incident and made recommendations with respect to the process of incident management from a media relations perspective.
Included in the report is a discussion on the effect of apologizing, both from the point of view of the perceived assignment/assuming of blame by the person or agency apologizing, and from a more pragmatic and realistic point of view that an apology statistically lowers legal costs and increases public support.
Overall, the report recognizes organizational and systemic deficiencies in the handling of media issues relating to the death of Mr. Dzierkanski and suggests steps to be taken to address and correct them.
Factual Errors by the MRO
At approximately 7:23 a.m. on October 14, 2007, just hours after the death of Mr. Dziekanski, a briefing was held at the Richmond RCMP Detachment at which IHIT investigators attended along with Sergeant Lemaitre and Corporal Carr. Sergeant Lemaitre was with the RCMP "E" Division Strategic Communications, while Corporal Carr was the MRO for IHIT.
Evidence presented during the Braidwood Inquiry has demonstrated that during the briefing, the Pritchard video was viewed by those in attendance and in addition, Corporal Robinson, one of the RCMP members involved in the interaction with Mr. Dziekanski, also attended to provide investigators with his version of the incident (see the section in the body of the report titled The IHIT Investigation, sub-section titled Presence of Corporal Robinson at Richmond Detachment Briefing). Both Sergeant Lemaitre and Corporal Carr said in evidence before the Braidwood Commission that they viewed the video briefly. Sergeant Lemaitre said that he paid little attention to Corporal Robinson's version of events and said that he was able to tune it out of his mind.
During media interviews in the days immediately following the death of Mr. Dziekanski, Sergeant Lemaitre made a number of statements of fact and provided speculation to the media as to the state of mind of Mr. Dziekanski. He was also critical of the recollection of Ms. Sima Ashrafinia, one of the witnesses to the incident. At various points during those interviews Sergeant Lemaitre used the term "going on the record," apparently to impress upon the media the veracity of the information he was conveying.
Sergeant Lemaitre was the RCMP's MRO with respect to the Ian Bush matter and as such he was criticized for providing too little information to the media in that situation. In his statement to the RCMP Part VII complaint investigator, Sergeant Lemaitre said that he felt pressure because of the criticism from the Ian Bush matter to release more information than he had done in that case.
In the early part of the investigation the team commander, Staff Sergeant (then Sergeant) David Attew, discussed with Sergeant Lemaitre the information to be released to the media. Staff Sergeant Attew later said that he was surprised when he learned of the information Sergeant Lemaitre had released to the media because it was not what had been agreed between them. Staff Sergeant Attew was concerned that the "spin" being placed by Sergeant Lemaitre would be seen as self-serving to the RCMP, appeared to be defensive in tone and contained inaccuracies. This concern came to be shared by Superintendent Rideout, who opted to remove Sergeant Lemaitre and replace him as MRO with Corporal Carr.
Clearly, it was recognized early by IHIT investigators that some of the information imparted by Sergeant Lemaitre was incorrect and/or speculative. As will be discussed below, no steps were taken by IHIT to correct these inaccuracies. Although not exhaustive, this included statements by Sergeant Lemaitre that:
- The CEW had been cycled twice. Sergeant Lemaitre indicated that the source of his information in this regard was IHIT195 and stated: We know for a fact that there were two pulses.196 (This was later confirmed by Constable Baltzer's download report to be five cycles);
- Three RCMP members attended the incident involving Mr. Dziekanski (the actual number was four). At the time of making this statement, Sergeant Lemaitre was responding to a question concerning a discrepancy between the number of members reported by a witness (five) and the number actually attending. Sergeant Lemaitre went on to speculate that two YVR security employees dressed in uniforms and bright yellow jackets could have been misinterpreted for RCMP members. Those two plus the three members who he said did attend would account for the five reported by the witness;
- No YVR video of the incident existed. Sergeant Lemaitre stated: I can tell you that there was no video camera in that area at the airport.197 The tape then stops. It is not known, therefore, whether Sergeant Lemaitre qualified this statement any further. The statement was in response to a media question as to whether there existed video coverage of the international arrivals area at YVR (Sergeant Lemaitre had viewed the Pritchard video when he made this statement). In fact, YVR video of the area did exist. Unfortunately, the quality of the video and the distance of the camera from the events rendered it virtually useless;
- Mr. Dziekanski may have had drugs or alcohol in his system (later shown to be false); and
- Mr. Dziekanski received a second "pulse" from the CEW and there was absolutely no change in disposition. Still erratic, violent.198 He said that after the three members physically controlled Mr. Dziekanski on the ground, they placed handcuffs on him to stop Mr. Dziekanski from punching and fighting. Mr. Dziekanski slipped into unconsciousness and one member continued to monitor his pulse and vital signs up to the time that EMS took over.
In his statement to Staff Sergeant Forster, Sergeant Lemaitre said that he did attend the Richmond Detachment briefing on the morning of October 14, 2007 and viewed the Pritchard video one time. He recalled the IHIT members present discussing the file and what each witness had said, but said that he shut it out of his mind because he did not need to know that information.
When asked about the statement that there was no video in the area of the incident, Sergeant Lemaitre implied that Corporal Carr told him not to mention the Pritchard video and said that he was responding to a question about the availability of YVR surveillance video. He knew the Pritchard video was a key piece of evidence, and he did not believe that it was up to him to divulge its existence, absent clear direction from IHIT that he could talk about it.
Sergeant Lemaitre stated during his Part VII interview by Staff Sergeant Forster that he said that there were two cycles of the CEW because that was what he had heard at the Richmond Detachment briefing on the morning of October 14, 2007. The same rationale was provided as the reason he indicated that three RCMP members had responded to the incident involving Mr. Dziekanski.
He recalled explaining the IM/IM during a media interview, but believed he was simply providing background and context, as opposed to justifying the actions of the involved RCMP members. With respect to the comments that Mr. Dziekanski may have consumed alcohol or drugs, Sergeant Lemaitre stated that he was simply providing comments based on his experience as a police officer. In his evidence before the Braidwood Inquiry, Sergeant Lemaitre stated that he was clear in the interview that he was speculating and said that he added during the interview that [i]t would be up to a coroner and the toxicology report to give us those answers.
Sergeant Lemaitre did indicate in a French language interview conducted on November 14, 2007 that some of the information he had provided in the hours after the death of Mr. Dziekanski had been incorrect. He did not go into specifics, but indicated that he had been misinformed. The media reported that Sergeant Lemaitre would not make the same statement in English. No such corrections were made by him or any other MRO or IHIT representative in the English media. Sergeant Lemaitre's position was that he made the clarifications he did in the French interview because he was responding to a question from the media. He stated that he did not have the authority to clarify any information for the English media.
Sergeant Lemaitre stated that he challenged Ms. Ashrafinia's version of events in the media interview because, based on the information he had been provided, he believed that she was incorrect. In his statement he recognized that by making such comments he could be perceived as being less than impartial. He stated that he was never notified by Corporal Carr or anyone else at IHIT that there were problems with his media releases, nor was he ever told why he was taken off the file.
Failure to Correct Known Errors
As indicated, factual errors in information provided to the media were known to IHIT investigators shortly after the investigation began. Staff Sergeant (then Sergeant) Attew became aware of discrepancies and errors in the media information released by Sergeant Lemaitre. He was concerned not only because of the errors, but because Sergeant Lemaitre had released information which had not been agreed to by IHIT and because the tone of Sergeant Lemaitre's media releases were defensive with respect to the actions of the RCMP members involved. He believed that Sergeant Lemaitre should have provided factual information only (as per policy) because the matter was still under investigation and no definitive findings had yet been made. He said that he spoke with Corporal Carr, the IHIT MRO, and asked him to follow up with Sergeant Lemaitre informally. Corporal Carr said he never did follow up with Sergeant Lemaitre. No rationale was provided, other than Corporal Carr saying that he did not want to second-guess Sergeant Lemaitre.
The matter was not pursued through the chain of command. As noted, Superintendent Rideout became aware of the issues, and opted to remove Sergeant Lemaitre as MRO and replace him with Corporal Carr.
The decision not to correct known deficiencies was made by Superintendent Rideout as Officer in Charge of IHIT. He believed that attempting to correct errors and misstatements would cause more problems than it would cure because the police would be placed in the position of having to provide updates and explanations, thereby placing the integrity of the investigation in jeopardy and running the risk of having the issues tried in the media. Superintendent Rideout therefore determined that it would be better to say nothing.
During a press conference on December 12, 2008,199 Superintendent Rideout stated:
We recognize that some of the information provided today is inconsistent with what was said by the RCMP at the onset of the investigation.
In the early days following the incident, an RCMP spokesperson stated that the conducted energy weapon was deployed twice. It is now clear that there were three cycles in probe mode and two in push stun mode.
The RCMP spokesman conveyed the information he had been provided from one of the officers present at the airport. That officer did not himself deploy the conducted energy weapon.
The reason the RCMP could not publicly correct the information when it was determined that a mis-statement had been made, is that, by that time a criminal investigation had been undertaken. Prior to the conclusion of the investigation, the provision of a report to Provincial Crown Counsel and a determination of whether criminal charges would be laid, it would not have been appropriate to disclose publicly the evidence that had been gathered.
The IHIT investigation into the incident at Vancouver International Airport has been concluded. Throughout the process, we have adhered to the policies and principles that apply to all major investigations, and believe our conclusions are fact-based and reasonable.
I am of the opinion that correcting relatively straightforward inaccuracies such as the number of members present or the number of times the CEW was cycled would not have compromised the position of the RCMP vis-à-vis any criminal investigation of the events. It is incumbent on the RCMP to take all reasonable steps to confirm information prior to it being provided to the public and to correct inaccuracies when they are found unless an overriding rationale exists as to why that information should not be made public.
At the same news conference on December 12, 2008, Superintendent Rideout was asked the following question and he responded (question is in bold and the response in regular italic type):
It looked like that the officers backed up because they knew they were going to deploy the Taser® and not because of the stapler. What did the IHIT investigation reveal?
Supt. Wayne Rideout: The IHIT investigation looked at the entire incident in context with every other component in this investigation, Mr. Dziekanski's behaviour in the hours and minutes before the officers encountered him. The entire video showed that Mr. Dziekanski was disoriented, confused and appeared to be somewhat incoherent. While enroute to responding to the incident, the officers received update information about the situation through the radio. They were advised on the nature of the complaint that they were responding to. By policy, their duty necessitated them to take Mr. Dziekanski's (sic) into custody. They would be making assessment as to how they would do that while they were enroute, based on all available information to them. We know that occurred.
The officers were making observations based on what they saw. It is extremely important that we recognized what they saw, what facial expressions and body movements led them to believe. The act of throwing up the hands can be interpreted as one of non-compliant and a resisting or combative posture. When that is followed by picking up a stapler and turning into the direction of the officers, we recognized that this behaviour was seen as extraordinary and combative. We interpreted that's why the actions were followed as they did.
Superintendent Rideout was asked by the Commission to explain his comment above that [w]e know that occurred. He indicated that his reference was to the knowledge that the responding members had received information over the police radio as they were en route to the scene. Superintendent Rideout was unequivocal that IHIT had no knowledge or awareness that the responding members had discussed or considered the use of the CEW against Mr. Dziekanski prior to their arrival at the exit doors from the internationals arrivals level of YVR.
The primary questions to be asked are whether, over time, the media releases provided by the RCMP were fair and objective and whether or not the public was provided with appropriate and sufficient information. There is a need to protect the evidence gathered from public dissemination and to ensure that one witness is not tainted or tempted to tailor evidence based on the evidence of another.
In a press release issued on November 30, 2007, Corporal Carr, who had assumed the MRO role from Sergeant Lemaitre, stated:200
The investigative team would like to address an issue surrounding the perception that police did not administer first aid to Mr. Dziekanski after administering the Conducted Energy Weapon.
Although the investigation is not complete at this time, investigators can say, based on current information, the following:
Immediately after the CEW was deployed on Mr. Dziekanski, officers arrested him and placed him in handcuffs.
Investigators have learned that Mr. Dziekanski was monitored by both the police at the scene and YVR security, breathing and pulse were present. During what would be a regular on-going assessment of Mr. Dziekanski's state, officer's [sic] noticed that he had become unconscious. Emergency medical personnel were called to attend. The officers and the YVR Security member continued monitoring Mr. Dziekanski and continued to identify that breathing and a pulse was present. This monitoring continued with the same findings throughout the time that it took emergency medical personnel to arrive at the scene.
Investigators have learned that upon the arrival of Richmond Fire Department a request was made to have the handcuffs removed from Mr. Dziekanski, officers did not remove the handcuffs at this time as they had a safety concern. It is the role of police to render a situation safe in order that emergency medical personnel can effectively perform their duties. Upon the arrival of BC Ambulance service a short time later, BCAS personnel requested the handcuffs be removed, it was at that time the officers assessed and removed the handcuffs.
It is important to understand investigators have learned that based on the continuous monitoring of Mr. Dziekanski it was the opinion of officers and the YVR security member at the incident that Mr. Dziekanski was breathing and had a pulse, however he was unconscious the entire period while awaiting for emergency medical personnel to attend.
It is important to understand that the care and monitoring of Mr. Dziekanski will form part of our investigation and submissions will be going forward in our reports for Coroner's Inquest, Commission for Public Complaints investigation, Public Inquiry, RCMP Internal Investigation, OPP file review.
The press release appears to be factually correct. In my view, however, it leaves an impression which is not supported by the video taken by Mr. Pritchard. Firstly, the release mentioned that Mr. Dziekanski was handcuffed and that RCMP members were reluctant to remove the handcuffs because of safety concerns, presumably because Mr. Dziekanski would regain consciousness and continue to struggle. This issue has been discussed in the section of the report concerning first aid administered to Mr. Dziekanski, at page 17.
The issue of the impression left by RCMP media releases was also discussed in my Final Report on Chair-Initiated Complaint into the Shooting Death of Ian Bush – November 28, 2007.201 In that decision, I recommended that [t]he RCMP develop a media and communications strategy specifically for police-involved shooting investigations that recognizes the need for regular, meaningful and timely updates to the media and to the public. In addition, the media and communications strategy should include a publicly available general investigative outline of the steps to be taken and the anticipated timeline for each step.
Clearly, errors were made in releasing incorrect information to the media and those errors should have been corrected. Although the evidence does not allow me to state that the errors were intentional or were intended to demean Mr. Dziekanski, I am concerned that in an effort to put a positive face on the actions of the involved RCMP members, Sergeant Lemaitre and, to a lesser degree Corporal Carr, engaged in speculation and supposition which went well beyond the scope of applicable RCMP policy and potentially misled the public.
As Superintendent Rideout pointed out in his interview with the Commission, his concern was that the integrity of the investigation be safeguarded and that information not be disseminated which could potentially cause witnesses to tailor their evidence. To carry out that goal, his view was that errors should not be corrected because to do so would have required IHIT investigators to release information considered sensitive to the investigation, which could have compromised the integrity of the investigation. He chose not to correct the errors to avoid having to provide the correct information and to avoid what he anticipated would be numerous questions from the media which he believed would also have negatively affected the integrity of the investigation.
He now holds the view that he could have indicated to the public that errors were made in information provided to the media by the RCMP, but he was not prepared to address or correct them at that time.
RCMP Investigation of the BCCLA Public Complaint
The standard of investigation by the RCMP of a public complaint lodged under Part VII of the RCMP Act is addressed in section 8 of the Commissioner's Standing Order (Public Complaints):
8. A member responsible for conducting the investigation of a complaint shall
(a) conduct the investigation in an objective and neutral manner consistent with recognized investigative procedures; and
(b) impartially and diligently gather evidence with a view to bringing the investigation to a conclusion.
On December 12, 2007 Staff Sergeant T.K. Forster was assigned to conduct the investigation of the BCCLA public complaint pursuant to Part VII of the RCMP Act. The crux of the BCCLA complaint required him to review, analyze and attempt to determine the veracity of the impugned MRO comments pertaining to the death of Mr. Dziekanski. Although a number of examples of MRO media statements were cited, the BCCLA complaint was somewhat open-ended in that the complaint alleged that ... relevant RCMP member(s) misrepresented themselves to the public on various occasions202.... The position of the BCCLA appears to be that the RCMP should have conducted an investigation into all statements made by MROs relating to the death of Mr. Dziekanski and investigated each.
Staff Sergeant Forster attempted to obtain video from media sources; however, apparently the media were not inclined to share video with the police absent judicial compulsion. Since an investigation pursuant to Part VII of the RCMP Act is not criminal in nature, no authority exists to obtain a search warrant or production order under the auspices of the Criminal Code, or to compel the production of potential evidence through other means.
In addition, Staff Sergeant Forster met with the BCCLA in an attempt to obtain any additional information or material which may have assisted him in his task.203 The BCCLA provided a number of citations, but took the position that the material in question was in the public domain and declined to provide additional information pertaining to MRO interviews. The BCCLA cited the fact that it is a small, non-profit organization which does not have the resources to fully monitor the media, and took the position that it is the responsibility of the police to seek out and obtain such data. As noted, the media also declined to assist in furthering Staff Sergeant Forster's efforts to obtain raw footage of MRO interviews.
Staff Sergeant Forster did contact the relevant media outlets; however, each either referred the matter to their counsel (who refused to comply) or refused outright to assist in the investigation.
I am satisfied that Staff Sergeant Forster made appropriate attempts to contact relevant media outlets and obtain data pertaining to the impugned MRO interviews, and that he was denied such access by each of those same outlets.
Ultimately, Staff Sergeant Forster was left to review video and media information recorded from public media broadcasts by the RCMP "E" Division media monitoring group. The unfortunate reality, therefore, is that Staff Sergeant Forster was only able to review that material which had been broadcast or printed by the media. He was not able to review the entirety of interviews taped by the media with RCMP MROs to determine whether the MROs had provided appropriate caveats and/or context or whether print media quotes were attributed accurately.
The relevant questions, however, are whether the investigation adequately addressed the BCCLA complaint and whether the conclusions drawn by Staff Sergeant Forster are accurate and supportable. The BCCLA raised the issue in its request for review that not all of its allegations were investigated. Specifically, the BCCLA in its March 19, 2009 letter to the Commission requesting a review of the RCMP Part VII investigation raised the fact that some allegations were conflated or ignored altogether. Whether or not the initial complaint of the BCCLA listed specific allegations (the BCCLA's initial letter of complaint of November 13, 2007 did not list specific allegations, but provided a narrative of issues), Staff Sergeant Forster was at liberty to investigate as he saw fit within the confines of the applicable standard of investigation.
None of the allegations brought forward by the BCCLA was found by the RCMP to be supportable. In some cases, this was because no bad faith or negative intent were noted on the part of the MRO involved, while in others a lack of cooperation from media outlets meant that there was insufficient evidence on which to base a finding. That said, and as I have noted, I do have concerns with the approach taken by the RCMP media relations members in light of the fact that the public received incorrect and/or incomplete information.
Having reviewed the RCMP Part VII investigation, I find no reason to question either the impartiality of the investigator or the conclusions he has drawn with respect to the allegations. While some specific issues raised by the BCCLA may not have been canvassed to the satisfaction of the BCCLA, I am not of the view that the Part VII public complaint investigation conducted by Staff Sergeant Forster was below acceptable standards.
190 The BCCLA initiated a separate complaint with the Commission on October 24, 2007 concerning the conduct of the four RCMP members who were directly involved at the time of Mr. Dziekanski's arrest and subsequent death.
191 OM.27.2.2.
192 OM 27.1.1.2
193 OM 27.3.3.1.
194 See Vancouver Sun article on the same topic, June 20, 2009.
195 CBC video, October 16, 2007 at the 03:12 mark.
196 CBC video, October 16, 2007 at the 03:30 mark.
197 CBC video, October 16, 2007 at the 07:42 mark.
198 CBC video, October 16, 2007 at the 06:28 mark.
199 See YVR News Conference Statements: A/Commissioner Al Macintyre – "E" Division CROPS Officer (2008-12-12 11:30 PST, File # LM 2007-36874).
200 See Update on a Portion of DZIEKANSKI Investigation (2007-11-30 19:17 PST, File # IHIT 2007-LM-36874).
201 See my Final Report on the Ian Bush death (November 28, 2007 File No.: PC-2006-1532).
202 Letter of complaint from BCCLA to Commission, dated November 13, 2007, p. 3.
203 BCCLA letter dated March 19, 2009 to P. Kennedy.