Police Investigating Police – Final Public Report
Appendix 3: Additional relevant reports
Four additional high profile reports have recently been released that address the issue of police investigating police. Each made significant recommendations for change to improve the current police oversight system-all of which were actively considered by the CPC in the development of its own recommended model for the RCMP. Highlights are outlined below.
1. December 2006: Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar: A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities.
The report made 13 recommendations for enhancements to the review of the RCMP's national security activities (in addition to the national security activities of other government departments). Of particular relevance to the police investigating police issue were the following recommendations for the CPC (which Justice O'Connor recommended should be restructured and renamed the Independent Complaints and National Security Review Agency for the RCMP, ICRA for short):
- Recommendation 3a: ICRA [should have the authority to] conduct self-initiated reviews with respect to the RCMP's national security activities, similar to those conducted by the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) with respect to CSIS.
- Recommendation 3c: ICRA's mandate should include authority to conduct joint reviews or investigations with SIRC and the [Communications Security Establishment] CSE Commissioner into integrated national security operations involving the RCMP.
- Recommendation 3d: ICRA [should have the authority to] conduct reviews or investigations into the national security activities of the RCMP where the Minister of Public Safety so requests.
- Recommendation 4: ICRA should have the following powers:
- (a) extensive investigative powers, similar to those for public inquiries under the Inquiries Act, to allow it to obtain the information and evidence it considers necessary to carry out thorough reviews and investigations; those powers should include the power to subpoena documents and compel testimony from the RCMP and any federal, provincial, municipal or private sector entity or person;
- (b) power to stay an investigation or review because it will interfere with an ongoing investigation or prosecution; [...]
- (d) power to engage in or to commission research on matters affecting the review body.
- Recommendation 5a: ICRA should [have] in the first instance, ability [...] to refer a complaint to the RCMP [...] or to investigate the complaint itself, if deemed appropriate.
- Recommendation 5e: With respect to complaints, opportunity for the Commissioner of the RCMP and affected members of the RCMP to make representations to ICRA and, when a hearing is commenced, to present evidence and be heard personally or through counsel.
- Recommendation 5i: ICRA [should have] the ability [...] to seek the opinions or comments of other accountability bodies such as the Canadian Human Rights Commission, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada and the Information Commissioner of Canada.
- Recommendation 8: ICRA should have an adequate budget to fulfill its mandate in relation to the RCMP's national security activities, including for purposes of self-initiated review.
- Recommendation 11: The government should establish statutory gateways among the national security review bodies, including ICRA, in order to provide for the exchange of information, referral of investigations, conduct of joint investigations and coordination in the preparation of reports.
- Recommendation 12: The government should establish a committee, to be known as the integrated National Security Review Coordinating Committee...comprising the chairs of ICRA and [SIRC], the CSE Commissioner and an outside person to act as Committee Chair. INSRCC would have the following mandate:
- to report on accountability issues relating to practices and trends in the area of national security in Canada;
- to initiate discussion for co-operative review with independent review bodies for provincial and municipal police forces involved in national security activities.
2. December 2007: Rebuilding the Trust: The Task Force on Governance and Culture Change in the RCMP
The Task Force on Governance and Culture Change in the RCMP, headed by David Brown, Q.C., released its findings on December 14, 2007.1 This review was important to all provinces that utilize the RCMP as their provincial police force, as the western provinces do. The report revealed that "radical changes" are needed in the way that the RCMP accounts to the public. One of the report's 49 recommendations opted for the creation of a new Independent Commission for Complaints and Oversight of the RCMP.2 The report included the following recommended features of a public complaints process:
- The RCMP should attempt informal resolution of complaints as early as possible.
- If the RCMP is unable to resolve complaints informally, the report recommends that an "effective complaints body must have complete authority to oversee, monitor, review, initiate and, if necessary, investigate complaints."
- Where complaints relate to policy or service issues, they should be referred directly to a public complaints body for consideration and response.
- Complaints relating to actions of a police officer or the performance of an officer's duties should be referred initially to the head of the Force.
Create an Independent Commission for Complaints and Oversight for the RCMP (ICCOR) – established under the RCMP Act reporting to the Minister. Proposed body would:
- Incorporate the mandates of the CPC and the ERC with expanded responsibilities and authorities (consistent with an Ombudsman). The proposed ICCOR structure:
- Investigations unit with experienced investigators;
- Dispute mediation unit;
- Complaint evaluation and data collection unit;
- Separate external review function for grievance and discipline appeals.
Proposed ICCOR responsibilities:
- Initiate investigations.
- Self-initiate reviews (or at the request of the Minister, the Commissioner or the proposed RCMP Board of Management) of any incident/aspect of RCMP operations.
- Act as central and single collection and processing point for all complaints against RCMP members, regardless of origin.
- Track and evaluate complaints, discipline and grievances to identify systemic issues and trends (or key deficiencies).
- Mandate to review any aspect of police operations including operational reviews;
- Make recommendations to the Commissioner and the proposed Board of Management as well as report publicly on recommendations and findings;
- Consider complaints and conduct investigations in private (if appropriate).
3. September 2008: Oversight Unseen: Investigation into the Special Investigations Unit's Operational Effectiveness and Credibility
After receiving public complaints questioning the thoroughness and independence of Ontario's Special Investigations Unit (SIU) investigations, the Ontario Ombudsman, Mr. André Marin, launched an investigation into the agency's credibility and effectiveness.
The Ombudsman determined that the SIU faces numerous challenges, "continues to struggle to assert its authority," and because it is staffed by several former police officials, it is "steeped in police culture." The Ombudsman insisted on the need for greater transparency and independence.
The report contained 46 recommendations directed at the SIU, the Attorney General, and the Ontario Government. Among them, the Ombudsman advised that none of the SIU members should be involved "in any capacity" in cases implicating their former police force; that the agency take "immediate steps" to ensure civilian representation among investigative managers; and that concerns pertaining to certain policing practices, such as the use of Tasers,3 that emerge during the course of SIU investigation, should be made public.
Following the release of the report, on September 30, 2008, the Ministry of the Attorney General pledged several concessions, including increases in the budget of the unit and funding for a Mobile Investigative Centre that will allow the SIU investigators to arrive at the scene of major incidents independent of the police service involved.
4. February 2009: Alone and Cold: Inquiry into the Death of Frank Paul – The Davies Commission, Interim Report
- In December 1998, Frank Paul was rejected from jail, not given an option of staying in the sobering unit of the Detox Centre and left in an alley overnight by two police officers from the Vancouver Police Department (VPD).
- On February 22, 2007 the Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General announced a public inquiry into the Frank Paul case.
- The Commission of Inquiry, headed by former B.C. Supreme Court Judge William H. Davies, Q.C., examined the circumstances of Paul's death as well as the pursuant police investigation, an investigation "flawed by reason of inadequate policies and conflicts of interest inherent in police officers investigating fellow police officers for possible criminal conduct."
- The report was released on February 12, 2009. It contains 12 recommendations. Of particular interest are:
- 4. I recommend that British Columbia develop a civilian-based criminal investigation model for the investigation of police-related deaths occurring in the municipalities policed by the 11 municipal police departments.
- 5. I recommend that the initial mandate of this organization (which I suggest be named the Independent Investigation Office [IIO]) [...] include a wide variety of factual circumstances, including [...] a death in a police department jail cell, a death resulting from an officer's use of force or a motor vehicle, or a death arising from some other form of police interaction with the deceased.
- 8. To ensure the IIO's unquestioned authority to act, I recommend that its essential powers be entrenched in legislation, such as:
- the IIO director and investigators have the status of peace officers;
- the IIO becomes the lead investigative agency, and the home police department has no investigative responsibility or authority, except as granted by IIO.
- 9. I recommend that the director recommends to the Criminal Justice Branch whether criminal charges should be laid, and if so, which charges, involving which officer or officers.
- 11. I recommend that the statutory mandate of the Police Complaint Commissioner be extended to include the requirement that the commissioner conduct professional standards investigations of all police-related deaths arising in those British Columbia jurisdictions policed by municipal police departments.
- 12. I recommend that Recommendations 29-35 of Mr. Wood's 2007 Report be implemented.
1 Rebuilding the Trust – Report of the Task Force On Governance and Cultural Change in the RCMP, December 2007.
2 Recommendation 3.
3 Also known as conducted energy weapons.