Chair-Initiated Complaint into the Shooting Death of Kevin St. Arnaud in Vanderhoof, British Columbia and into the Adequacy of the Subsequent RCMP Investigation
Executive Summary
This report examines one of the most serious incidents that can engage the public's attention; the use of force by a police officer that results in the death of an individual.
I have examined in detail the facts of this case with a view to ascertaining:
- whether Constable Sheremetta was justified in his use of deadly force; and,
- whether the "E" Division North District Major Crime Unit conducted an adequate investigation of the shooting.
For reasons that will be described in more detail below, the RCMP's investigation of the circumstances surrounding the death of Mr. St. Arnaud fell below an acceptable standard. This report will also assess the circumstances surrounding the use of force by the police that caused Mr. St. Arnaud's death and the number of expert reports, physical evidence and statements proffered in relation thereto.
On December 19, 2004 at approximately 12:50 a.m., Mr. Kevin St. Arnaud broke into a pharmacy in a mall in Vanderhoof, British Columbia. In response to the break-in alarm, Constable Ryan Sheremetta and Constable Colleen Erickson, both members of the Vanderhoof RCMP, attended in separate police vehicles. Constable Sheremetta observed Mr. St. Arnaud running from the mall and pursued him in his police vehicle to the Vanderhoof curling rink at which point he left his police vehicle and continued the pursuit on foot.
Constable Sheremetta followed Mr. St. Arnaud onto a soccer field while all the time yelling commands for Mr. St. Arnaud to stop. Mr. St. Arnaud eventually stopped, turned around and came back towards Constable Sheremetta. Mr. St. Arnaud continued to advance upon Constable Sheremetta, who later recounted that he stepped backwards but slipped and fell on his back and from this position shot Mr. St. Arnaud three times in the chest.
Constable Erickson, who was in a police vehicle, had come around from the curling rink and was driving beside the tennis court and soccer field when she heard yelling, observed Mr. St. Arnaud "kind of charging back at Constable Sheremetta" and observed Constable Sheremetta, while standing in a police shooting stance, shoot Mr. St. Arnaud twice from a distance of approximately ten feet.
The subsequent autopsy confirmed that Mr. St. Arnaud was shot, in fact, three times. The contradictory descriptions of the position from which Constable Sheremetta shot Mr. St. Arnaud are assessed in detail in the full report.
Key Issues Addressed in This Report
- Whether a member of the RCMP improperly discharged his firearm during the incident; and
- Whether members of the RCMP conducted an adequate investigation into the death of Mr. St. Arnaud.
1. Discharge of a Firearm
Subsection 25(1) of the Criminal Code authorizes a police officer who is acting in the administration or enforcement of the law to use as much force as is necessary for that purpose. Section 34(2) of the Criminal Code authorizes any person who is unlawfully assaulted to use force that causes death or grievous bodily harm in self-defence to repel the assault. To rely on this protection, the person must have a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm and must also believe that he cannot otherwise preserve himself from death or grievous bodily harm.
Prior to utilizing force, it is incumbent upon a peace officer to perform a risk assessment, which is accompanied by a consideration of the situational factors specific to each incident. Situational factors would include weather conditions, subject size in relation to the member, presence of weapons, number of subjects and of police, as well as a host of other incident-specific considerations. In addition, RCMP members are trained to utilize one level of intervention higher than the demonstrated resistance level of the person they are dealing with.
On the night in question, Constable Sheremetta knew that an alarm had been activated at the pharmacy and upon arrival learned that there was indeed at least one male suspect still within the mall where the pharmacy was located. As the pursuit outside the mall unfolded, Constable Sheremetta related that Mr. St. Arnaud repeatedly looked back at him and continued to ignore his commands to stop. Most importantly, he observed Mr. St. Arnaud running one-handed, in other words keeping his right hand in his pocket. Constable Sheremetta expressed concern about not knowing where his back-up, Constable Erickson, was and during the final portions of the interaction he was keenly aware that he had to deal with Mr. St. Arnaud alone, at night-in the dark, on an isolated soccer field.
The accounts of Constable Sheremetta and Constable Erickson, as the only two witnesses to the shooting, have been examined in order to determine the actual unfolding of events.
Regrettably, eye-witness accounts of events are not always reliable. In this case, Constable Sheremetta's perceptions were likely affected by his heightened state of anxiety. He misperceived Mr. St. Arnaud as having jumped off the roof of the mall and he misjudged Mr. St. Arnaud to be about six feet tall when in fact he was two and one-half inches shorter. Constable Erickson's recollection of events was not perfect either. She stated that she heard only two shots and saw only two muzzle flashes. The next closest civilian observer, Mr. Klassen, also maintained that he only heard two shots. While this aspect of her observations proved to be incorrect, she recounted Mr. St. Arnaud's charging back towards Constable Sheremetta in much the same way as Mr. Klassen and Constable Sheremetta himself. Constable Erickson also had an unobstructed view of the participants who were located in front and to the left of where she was driving.
Witness Recollections and Evidence
The recountings of the many witnesses interviewed in this case reflect the frailties of human powers of observation and recollection. Some of their testimony, given without any improper motive, is contradicted by other witnesses or the physical evidence.
One of the key challenges in this case is the apparent contradiction between Constable Sheremetta and Constable Erickson as to the position from which Constable Sheremetta shot Mr. St. Arnaud. With the exception of the expert testimony of Dr. Gail Thornton and Dr. James McNaughton, the fruits of the investigation conducted by the RCMP's North District Major Crime Unit are of little assistance.
What evidence that I have found to be relevant and reliable leads me to find that Constable Sheremetta while on the soccer field, having fallen down, regained his feet and fired from a standing position as observed by Constable Erickson. My finding is based upon Constable Sheremetta's assertion in his first statement, as confirmed by the depression in the snow as identified in the forensic investigation of Sergeant Doll and Corporal Beach and the observation of the ambulance attendants. The ground was universally described as being slippery and the lighting at the time was poor.
While it initially looked like Mr. St. Arnaud was going to surrender, this quickly changed when he lowered his hands and began charging toward Constable Sheremetta. Mr. St. Arnaud ignored Constable Sheremetta's shouted commands to stop and get down on his knees and responded by telling Constable Sheremetta that "you're going to have to shoot me mother fucker." By the time that Mr. St. Arnaud began approaching Constable Sheremetta he was at least combative. I find that his words and actions demonstrated his intent to assault Constable Sheremetta and escape custody.
The key issue is whether Mr. St. Arnaud posed a threat of grievous bodily harm or death. The critical observation noted by Constable Sheremetta was Mr. St. Arnaud's repeated placement of his hand in his pocket. I find that based upon a consideration of all the evidence, these actions would be wholly consistent with Mr. St. Arnaud trying to safeguard the drugs that he had stolen from the pharmacy.
It must also be remembered that Mr. St. Arnaud's blood alcohol level and various witnesses support a finding that he suffered from a significant degree of intoxication. Mr. St. Arnaud's utterances and facial expressions also demonstrated aggression and his words could be perceived as meaning that he contemplated a fight that would entail grievous bodily harm or death. During his duty to account statement, Constable Sheremetta stated that these actions caused him to fear for his life. Furthermore, Mr. St. Arnaud had already instigated one physical altercation earlier in the evening with an individual significantly larger than he was. In fact, the bar doorman who broke up the fight estimated that the other combatant outweighed Mr. St. Arnaud by approximately one hundred pounds.
By all accounts Mr. St. Arnaud advanced upon Constable Sheremetta while the latter had his firearm pointed directly at him. At the point he was shot, Mr. St. Arnaud was only five feet away from Constable Sheremetta. This highlights the dynamic nature of this incident. The five-foot distance between Mr. St. Arnaud and Constable Sheremetta could have been covered in a fraction of a second. This reality did not leave time for sober second thought. Constable Sheremetta was called upon to make a decision in that instant.
Having regard to all the evidence, I find Constable Sheremetta's apprehension that Mr. St. Arnaud posed a threat of grievous bodily harm or death to be reasonable.
Finding Regarding the Initial Interaction
- The members entered into their interaction with Mr. St. Arnaud lawfully and were duty bound to do so.
Finding Regarding Use of Force
- Constable Sheremetta shot Mr. St. Arnaud in self-defence after reasonably perceiving that Mr. St. Arnaud posed a threat of grievous bodily harm or death and believing that he could not otherwise preserve himself from grievous bodily harm or death other than by using deadly force.
2. Adequacy of the RCMP Investigation
The shooting was investigated by the RCMP's "E" Division North District Major Crime Unit (MCU) based in Prince George.
An adequate investigation in a major case such as a police-involved shooting resulting in death is an extremely complex undertaking and will include: securing and preserving the scene; interviewing all known witnesses and identifying other witnesses to be interviewed who may have material evidence about the event; examining the backgrounds of both the deceased and the RCMP member; obtaining and processing relevant forensic evidence including photographic evidence, non-DNA physical evidence, DNA-related evidence and evidence related to the firearm used in the shooting; canvassing surrounding areas for any further information about the event that may be relevant; and utilizing appropriate experts. The RCMP's investigation into the death of Mr. St. Arnaud similarly included a number of the tasks enumerated above.
Scene Security
From the outset, it is necessary for first responders to rigorously adhere to the fundamental principles governing all investigations. Securing the scene where the shooting took place should have been a priority; as in any criminal investigation, the preservation of physical evidence is a critical task.
Findings
- Constable Erickson failed to ensure scene security at the soccer field immediately following the shooting.
- Staff Sergeant Kowalewich should have removed Constable Erickson from the scene at the earliest opportunity, as she was a key eyewitness to the shooting.
- Staff Sergeant Kowalewich should have removed Constable Erickson from the scene at the earliest opportunity, to avoid any real or perceived bias, given her work relationship with Constable Sheremetta.
- Staff Sergeant Kowalewich failed to ensure scene security at the mall from the earliest opportunity.
Scene Preservation
The efforts of the officers at the soccer field, during the failed attempt to erect a tent, resulted in the contamination of the scene by various officers' footprints. A significant portion of the prints between an area containing an impression in the snow to some distance beyond where Mr. St. Arnaud's body lay was obliterated. This impression in the snow was considered by investigators to be consistent with the location and marks that would be expected if Constable Sheremetta had fallen, as he indicated in his duty to account statement. This area was key to subsequent efforts to analyze the movements of Constable Sheremetta and Mr. St. Arnaud leading up to the fatal shooting.
Although the scene ended up being poorly preserved, I find that this was largely due to the deteriorating weather conditions and poor communication between the investigative team and Sergeant Doll and Corporal Beach.
It seems reasonable that scene preservation may have been treated differently if Sergeant Doll and Corporal Beach were aware that Constable Sheremetta may have shot Mr. St. Arnaud from a standing position and the potential significance of that area of the crime scene.
Findings
- Sergeant Krebs provided the Forensic Identification Section members with only one of two possible versions of the shooting, which may have resulted in a failure to recognize the significance of that portion of the scene, which was ultimately contaminated by the footprints of other officers.
- The Forensic Identification Section failed to seize blood samples from the snow adjacent to Mr. St. Arnaud.
Impartiality of the Investigation
In many instances when the police investigate cases of a police-involved shooting, concerns about the impartiality of such an investigation are raised. Actions taken by the RCMP members have been assessed against the "impartiality criterion" that forms the framework of the Commission's Independent Observer Program. That criterion measures the appropriateness of the management structure and reporting structure, whether the investigative team's response to the incident was appropriate and proportionate, the timelines of the response, and lastly whether the members conducted themselves in a professional manner during the course of the investigation.
Findings
- Sergeant Krebs should have determined the availability of qualified and experienced non-detachment members to take statements from Constables Sheremetta and Erickson.
- Corporal MacLellan failed to adequately prepare for the interview of Constable Sheremetta by first interviewing Constable Erickson.
- Corporal MacLellan failed to identify the purpose of his interview of Constable Sheremetta and in particular to define the statement as a duty to account statement.
- Corporal MacLellan asked leading questions during the interviews of Constable Sheremetta and Constable Erickson which, although not appropriate, did not affect the reliability of the statements.
- Corporal MacLellan failed to apprehend the importance of the contradictory evidence regarding Constable Sheremetta's shooting position.
- Corporal MacLellan failed to re-interview Constable Sheremetta once he discovered the discrepancy between Constable Sheremetta's and Constable Erickson's versions of the shooting.
Sergeant Krebs was clearly leading the MCU when the investigation began and should have ensured that Vanderhoof Detachment personnel were aware of the limitations on their roles in the investigation. There is no evidence to indicate that he limited the role of non-MCU members in the investigation, the need for which was enhanced by the absence of the MCU from Vanderhoof for significant periods of time.
Finding
- Sergeant Krebs failed to exercise effective control over Corporal MacLellan's role in the investigation after initially using him to take Constable Sheremetta's duty to account statement.
Recommendation
- The RCMP should act forthwith to implement policy that provides direction to on-scene RCMP members in major cases involving investigation of police conduct, i.e. situations where the police investigate the police, including the need to ensure real and perceived impartiality.
Experts
As with most homicide investigations, the investigation into the death of Mr. St. Arnaud included the request for and utilization of a number of expert reports. The Commission has considered each such report and has identified where they are helpful and where they fall short of expectations.
Bloodstain Pattern Analysis Evidence
Findings
- Sergeant Krebs failed to provide sufficient background material to Sergeant Gallant to permit a thorough blood stain analysis.
- Sergeant Gallant made erroneous assumptions in arriving at conclusions not scientifically supported by the evidence.
- Sergeant Gallant demonstrated tunnel vision by his reluctance to modify his conclusions when faced with additional information that called his original conclusions into question.
Use of Force Expert Report
Findings
- The selection process for use of force experts gives rise to the possibility of real or perceived bias.
- There was an excessive delay in appointing the use of force expert due to insufficient resources.
- The RCMP failed to appoint a use of force expert with sufficient experience to handle a serious case dealing with a police-involved homicide.
Recommendations
- The RCMP should train a sufficiently large pool of full-time use of force experts to ensure qualified and experienced experts are available in a timely fashion to deal with major cases.
- The RCMP should streamline its appointment process for use of force experts and ensure transparency by establishing a set protocol for appointments.
The Investigational Timeline
A review of the investigation reveals that the brunt of the field investigation, including interviews and forensic seizures, was completed over the first 72 hours following the shooting. The bulk of physical evidence seized was also forwarded for analysis (toxicological, etc.) within that 72-hour period.
Expert opinions were sought in a timely fashion except that there was a significant delay of more than five months in obtaining a use of force expert. This type of expertise was an important area for the investigation and it should have been completed in a more expeditious manner. The RCMP's explanation for this cites resource shortfalls, which are now being addressed.
Finding
- The investigation was carried out in a timely manner except for the delay in selecting a use of force expert.
Major Case Management
None of the members involved in this investigation were accredited Major Case Management members as called for in RCMP policy. The RCMP has explained that at the time of the investigation, "E" Division certification procedures were less than a year old and the training process was ongoing. This meant that a full complement of accredited individuals was not yet available to conduct investigations. That shortfall has now been remedied and there are more accredited officers in "E" Division than investigative positions, which should ensure adequate availability in future cases. Accreditation issues aside, there were a number of failings in the application of the Major Case Management model in this case.
Findings
The Major Case Management model was not properly applied in this investigation:
- the team members were not accredited, as required by policy;
- Inspector Hopkins and Staff Sergeant Flath in their role as Team Commander did not exercise overall control or assume responsibility and accountability for the direction, speed and flow of the case, as required by policy;
- after using Corporal MacLellan to assist in the investigation, in a limited capacity, Sergeant Krebs failed to restrict Corporal MacLellan's subsequent involvement;
- Inspector Hopkins and Superintendent Killaly failed to keep notes of their involvement, as required by policy;
- Superintendent Killaly's and Inspector Van De Walle's involvement in the investigation was not clearly defined by the Major Case Management policy and helped create ambiguity as to the operational line management responsibility for the investigation; and
- the investigative team failed to conduct a critical debrief, as required by policy.
Recommendation
- The Major Case Management policy should be modified to clarify the distinction between those managers and supervisors providing operational decision-making and guidance and those providing administrative support.
Application of the principles that constitute the Major Case Management Model and adoption and implementation of the recommendations found in the Commission's report in respect of the death of Mr. Ian Bush would be a good point of departure for the RCMP as it seeks to restore and maintain the public's confidence in this sensitive area.
Conclusion
The use of lethal force by a police officer raises a number of concerns for the public particularly so when the investigation of such an event is carried out by the same police agency as that of the subject police officer. The shooting of Mr. St. Arnaud and the subsequent investigation conducted by the RCMP's North District Major Crime Unit is such a case. I have endeavoured to provide a fair and objective assessment of the shooting of Mr. St. Arnaud and the subsequent investigation and have made recommendations with an eye to effecting positive change. In so doing, I am cognizant that this incident was investigated prior to my recommendations made in the context of another tragic event-that of the death of Mr. Ian Bush-and in that regard many improvements have already been instituted by the RCMP. Hopefully this report will be of assistance to the RCMP to continue to improve the manner in which these events are investigated.